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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Our territory’s local government systems have evolved since time immemorial, keeping 
pace with the challenges of the development of human settlements.In these immemorial 
battles to determine the organic measurement of time and space in the development of 
human settlement, the nature of the centre-local community relations has been the 
subject of many academic studies (Rondinelli and Cheema, 1983; 1985; Griffin, 1985; 
Leela, 1975; Uphoff and Esman, 1984; White, 1986; Wekwete, 1987; 1992; 
Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1992).
Decentralisation is the most common concept used in Zimbabwe to describe the 
relations between the centre and the local communities. Whether this is the most 
appropriate mode to capture these intricate relations is not the issue. Rather, it is the 
exposition of the concrete objectives behind the evolution of centre-local relations from 
1980 in Zimbabwe, incorporating both the macro and micro actors and their interaction, 
that is the problem.
Prior to 1980 three forms of local government prevailed. These are Urban Councils 
(established under the Urban Councils Act of 1891), District Councils (African Councils 
Act 1937) and Rural Councils (Rural Councils Act 1966). Urban and Rural Councils 
reflected the interests of the European settlers and landowners who were also a key 
lobby in terms of national politics (Wekwete 1988). The two enjoyed a higher degree 
of delegated authority in the undertaking and provision of services. African Councils 
(District Councils) however, were linked to traditional authority of chiefs and sub chiefs 
and observations are that this system did not reflect the interests of the locals, but was 
rather meant to control native development in the interests of the European economy 
(Arrighi, 1967; Clarke, 1978; and Wekwete, 1988). Democratic representation, for 
Europeans only, was practised in Urban and Rural Councils. In African Councils central 
government was strongly represented by the District Commissioner.
The state of Zimbabwe demonstrated its commitment to the concept of decentralisation 
in 1980. To allow local participation in development and decision-making, a 
reorganisation exercise of the pre-independence local government system in rural and 
urban areas was carried out. Pre-independence Legal Instruments (African Councils 
Act, Urban Councils Act, Rural Councils Act) were amended and a new Act (Rural 
District Councils Act 1988) was enacted, in an attempt to reflect the new government’s 
thrust(for more detail see section 3.0).
This study therefore seeks to broach those issues which though implicit in the debates 
(Helmsing, Gasper, Wekwete, Mutizwa-Mangiza etc.) have not received full exposure. 
These issues include the conceptualisation of decentralisation and the motive force 
behind it and the stages it has gone through since 1980. Of particular concern is the gap 
between legislative acts and the situation on the ground. One question will therefore 
suffice: What is the impact of decentralisation as is practised in Zimbabwe on the 
performance of the local authorities? Three key features come to m ind  First, 
performance will be measured in terms of outcome rather than in terms of input which 
is often done. Second, the approach includes a number of factors which are external to 
local governments but nevertheless are assumed to affect their performance 
significantly. Third, the study will assume an interdisciplinary approach (Therkildson &
l
Semboja, 1989).
This article is divided into five sections. A brief review of the concept of decentralisation 
will be made in the first section. The second section discusses the general characteristics 
of the first two stages of decentralisation.This will be followed in section three and four 
by an assessment of the Performance Indicators and the impact of decentralisation on 
these indicators respectively. The last section will be the conclusion to the paper.
2.0 DECENTRALISATION: BEHIND THE FACADE
Centralisation, fashionable as it was during and immediately after World War II, had as 
its main objective, the promotion of the modernisation theory, in which international 
agencies had invested their hope for a quick economic, social and political recovery. 
Faith was placed in the "trickle down" and a "spread out effect" of benefits from 
concentrated industrial development in urban areas to alleviate poverty and generate 
income and savings down the line. The failure of the "trickle down" and "spread-out 
effect" became apparent in the early 1970s. Cracks began to show signalling the 
imminent shift in development theory. Theories which advocated for the involvement 
of the intended beneficiaries gained prominence and the policy shift to growth with 
equity gained popularity. Regional development corporations to stimulate local 
investment and greater agricultural production were established. Consequently, 
Provincial, District and Regional Planning Committees were set up to provide 
administrative structures and coordinate local initiatives.
Decentralisation was in the making. But did these new developments imply negation of 
the centre? The quickest and more fitting answer one can get is a big No. One would 
be tempted to argue that there should therefore be an umbilical link between the centre 
and the local levels to ensure that the whole does not fall into disorder. Nonetheless, 
the essence of the process of decentralisation is better captured by the forms that it takes. 
Deconcentration, Devolution, Delegation and Privatisation are the forms that come to 
mind (for detail see Rondinelli and Cheema, 1985; Gasper, 1991; Conyer, 1984; Nellis, 
1986; Hyden, 1983). Common in these four forms of decentralisation is their thrust on 
the reallocation of power (economic, political and social) from the centre to the local 
levels. Differences, though, exist on the operational side: how much of the power is 
allocated at a given time, by what means and to whom? These questions touch on what 
Conyer (1986) and Smith (1979) referred to as the "many dimensions" of decentralisation 
[see Conyer (1986) for the five dimensions].
These dimensions presuppose that there is a multiplicity of processes generated in the 
course of reallocation of power from the centre to lower levels. Indeed processes cannot 
be without the respective actors that generate them. Subsequently, the idea that in such 
a relationship some groups gain relative to others is likely to involve disagreements. 
Accordingly the view that decentralisation and indeed the forms it takes in practice, 
come about as a result of the coalition of groups who support it 
outweighing-cum-out-manoeuvoring the groups that oppose it (Smith, 1980) puts the 
debate on a new plane: that of the relation between state and civil society. The notion 
of a state as exclusively an institutional category, with its own coherence, logic and 
capability whose interest is viewed as solemnly the interest of its managers is taken to
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task. Concurring with Smith and also dismissing the above notion, Mamdani(1992) 
argues that "contradictions within civil society are reproduced within the state".
A question arises at this stage of the debate: who initiates decentralisation policies? Two 
suggestive views could be unveiled here. If the initiative is from the centre, Smith’s 
contribution raises the first suggestion that there are contradictions within the state 
itself. If down-top initiatives, to which Mamdani refers as sharp struggles from below, 
influence the pace and form of decentralisation, then it would only be proper to suggest 
that these contradictions would be located within the lower tiers of the governmental 
system (Province and Districts)and the different civil society institutions within them. 
The unifying link between these two broad processes would be that the latter is not just 
external to the state but rather various and even contradictory groups in civil society 
differently penetrate the state(Mamdani, 1992).
As is currently the case, the centre initiates the policies in developing countries 
suggesting also that the level of decentralisation is a reflection of the interaction of 
interest groups within the state itself. The balance of power between these groups and 
the level of influence from below would as a rule determine the preparedness and 
willingness of government to identify the appropriate functions that it can and should 
decentralise, to whom and at what stage(Rondinelli and Cheema, 1985).
Decentralisation is therefore not a singular process of change but is often a partial 
response to a multiple of internally and externally induced processes (Therkildson, 
Semboja, 1989). Gore (1984) opened a pandora box when he argued that regional 
policies are used to serve purposes such as assisting private capital accumulation or for 
legitimating and extending government authority. It is often argued that for the latter 
purpose to materialise a combination of central control and local autonomy is a 
necessary condition. If the logic of the above is that the centre has to cede some power 
in order to retain more, the new power centres that are created must have some 
independent scope, in order to be willing to largely serve the centre’s objectives. This 
compliments Smith’s assertion that decentralisation should be seen as part of the process 
by which dominant classes, including those at the local level, articulate their interests. 
In other words the state reinforces certain interests in civil society and undermine others 
(Mamdani, 1992).
The centre-local authority controversy raised by Griffin (1981) and Mashanda-Shopo 
(1987) fall within this debate. In advocating for decentralisation, Griffin warned that 
power at the local level can be more concentrated, more elitist and applied more 
ruthlessly against the poor than at the centre.Mashanda-Shopo alluded to the dangers 
of allowing national development objectives to be divided into local and national issues 
noting that such dualism, where local issues are non-political, can only divert the national 
effort to development into an uncoordinated series of petty and regional chauvinistic 
projects for municipal socialism. This, it seems, is a warning against unbridled devolution 
of power as the interest groups in the new power centres would determine their own 
destiny, some of which could be outside national policies. Gramsci(1971) might have, 
in his own way, summarised the above discussion in his attempt to explain the concept 
of governance:
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The ideas of the Free Trade movement are based on a theoretical error whose practical origin is 
not hard to identify. They are based on a distinction between political society and civil society, 
which is made into and presented as an organic one, whereas in fact it is merely methodological. 
Thus it is asserted that economic activity belongs to civil society, and that the State must not 
intervene to regulate it. But since in actual reality civil society and State are one and the same, it 
must be made clear that "laissez-faire" too is a form of state "regulation" introduced and maintained 
by legislative and coercive means. It is a deliberate policy conscious of its own ends and not the 
spontaneous, automatic expression of economic facts. Consequently, "laissez-faire" liberalism is a 
political programme, designed to change - in so far as it is victorious - a.State’s leading personnel 
and to change the economic programme of the State itself - in other words the distribution of the 
national income.
Griffin (1981) emphasises that the nature of the relationship between different 
participants in decentralisation depends on the circumstances under which 
decentralisation occurs.Local authorities provide the geographical and spatial context 
within which national development takes place.They therefore provide the territorial 
framework within which many actors involved in development interact. These include 
Central Government, Local Governments, Parastatals, Private Companies, NGOs, 
Community Organisations etc. The success of decentralisation policies indeed depends 
on the environment in which interaction among these organisations takes place. The 
combination of purpose between territorial and functional (Gasper, 1991) 
decentralisation becomes more important.This is so because the capacity of Local 
Government to carry out programmes and projects effectively and through reciprocal 
relationships with other organisations may be more significant than their legal status as 
independent units. (Rondinelli, 1985).Esman and Uphoff s (in Rondinelli 1985) argued 
that the ability of local authorities to provide services and generate development is a 
function of the linkages that local governments have with other organisations. This 
seems to strengthen the point that local authorities provide the space in which the 
interests of different actors interact and cross fertilize each other. The picture of a 
harmonious and non-ontradictory civil society is relegated to romantics(Mamdani 
1992). The context presented above depicts a contradictory combination with constant 
conflict between classes and groups each trying to impose its hegemony over the others.
To capture these struggles in a more synthesised way, Gasper (1991) alluded to the three 
attitudes observed in Indian literature. First, he noted that the orthodox mainstream 
defends decentralisation and centrally devised programmes for needy "target groups". 
Second, an orthodox opposition defends devolution and attacks the dominance of 
national elites in present policies.Third, one type of radical opposition accepts both 
critiques, but supports devolution as hopefully providing the incentives and opportunity 
for poor majorities to eventually mobilise.
These are preferences of different groups and this can also be reflective of the different 
groups within the state. But the question is how do these trends relate to the conclusion 
(Rondinelli, 1985) that only in those countries where decentralisation was defined more 
narrowly and the scope of policies was limited to reallocating functions among units of 
central government did developing countries achieve their intended goals. How far does 
this conclusion, as opposed to the above preference, accept the notion that 
decentralisation is a family means of various ends? Practice indicates that regardless of 
the preferences of different groups, forms of decentralisation are not independent of 
each other, but they run through one another, run side by side, cross one another, flow 
in and over one another and it is a ceaselessly moving changing sea of phenomena. In
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other words, it could be argued that small-scale incremental transfers of power and 
responsibilities to local government does not negate the other forms of decentralisation 
but strengthen them (Helmsing, 1991).
On the above note the section that follows will attempt to show, in a more descriptive 
fashion, whether the post-independence state has really desired a decentralised system 
or they have created an even more centralised system of governance in the process.
3.0 DECENTRALISATION IN ZIMBABWE: FROM 1980 TO 1993
The central objectives of the post independence government can be articulated in point 
form as follows:
1) To redress the imbalances in economic development, which were enshrined in the 
local government system.
2) Democratisation of the whole local government system.
3) Strengthening public participation in development. -
As mentioned earlier on, three stages of decentralisation can be identified over the past 
13 years. The first two, which have been completed, stretched from 1980 to 1993. The 
ten months old third stage in the evolution of decentralisation is yet to be explained.
3.1 Stage One: 1980-1984
Stage one (1980 to 1984) was characterised by the overhauling of the colonial local 
government system. About 220 former African councils were replaced by 55 district 
councils. The African Councils Act was superseded by the District Councils Act(1980) 
which placed a lot of emphasis on democratic representation in the newly constituted 
councils. The role of traditional authority fizzled out in the process, and so did the role 
of District Commissioner.
The newly constructed district councils did not have the capacity, both technical and 
financial, to provide the necessary infrastructure in the form of roads, bridges, boreholes, 
wells, schools, health centres etc. The District Development Fund(DDF) which is a 
quasi-governmental organisation acted as the major construction unit in the areas that 
fall under district councils’ jurisdiction. One of the major characteristics of this stage is 
that district councils did not have independent sources of revenue as the 
pre-independence sources (taxes) were discontinued in 1980. These were considered to 
be politically sensitive. As a rule, all the administrative expenses of council were met by 
the government. Government and non governmental organisations(NGOs) were the 
developmental agencies in these areas implying that functions were allocated among 
government units.
In urban areas the Urban Councils Act of 1973 was amended to reflect the new 
non-racial order. However, no major changes were introduced in the operations and/or 
functions of the urban councils. Their powers and responsibilities to provide services 
and raise revenue was not tempered with by the new Act.
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To compliment their effort Government chipped in with educational and health per 
capita grants. Rates (property tax) which are levied by councils on residents and business 
ventures remained their major source of income.
Rural councils continued intact. Compared to district councils these are largely 
self-sufficient and self-financing (Wekwete, 1988). Their main source of income is the 
unit tax charged on units of land and like in urban areas, from rating of land and 
improvements thereof. Loans and grants are also provided by central government.
A two-pronged system of local government in rural areas persisted over this period with 
the district councils co-existing with the rural councils. District councils represented the 
predominantly peasant farmers (small-holder farmers) and the rural councils 
represented the large scale commercial farmers.
3.2 Stage Two: 1985-1993
The then Prime Minister’s Directive of 1984 ushered in a new stage both territorially 
and functionally to the process of decentralisation. Local government was strengthened 
through the formalisation of the hierarchical link-pin system (Mutizwa-Mangiza, 
1986).Village and ward structures were formed within district and urban councils 
(although their legality is questionable in urban areas). These were expected to perform 
the following functions:
The Village Development Committee (VIDCO):
a) identify and articulate village needs;
b) co-ordinate and forward village needs to Ward Development Committees 
(WADCOs);
c) link between WADCOs and the people;
d) co-ordinate and co-operate with government extension workers at village level;
e) organise village work-force to undertake major village work programmes.
The Ward Development Committee (WARDCO):
a) provide a central planning, authority linking six villages
b) be an overseer that co-ordinates development plans of the six villages i.e. 
re-examining and prioritising projects and programmes that come from the villages.
The system provided decentralised structures of decision making at local authority levels 
to ensure that forums exist to facilitate coordination of local level decisions with central 
government ministries and agencies. The District Development Committee provides 
such a forum at the district level. Two new dimensions were introduced to district 
councils. Development levy as a source of income for district councils was legally
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introduced to increase their revenue base. The District Administrator’s (DA) post was 
reintroduced(recruitment began in 1982) albeit without some of the functions 
performed by their predecessors (District Commissioners), for example, issuing of birth 
and death certificates, identity cards, salaries for teachers etc. The DA is central 
government’s senior representative at the district level. District councils remained 
dependent on Central Government for salaries of their senior staff and allowances for 
councillors. Functions that are allocated to governments units were in this stage 
complemented by the district council’s own projects (both developmental and income 
generating projects), but the former remained the main agency for development. The 
dual structure of local government system in rural areas remained.
In urban areas the involvement of the Videos and the Wardcos in decision-making is 
minimal if they exist at all. Although the two lower institutions do exist at least on paper, 
the, equivalent of DDC in urban and rural council areas is not known. As was the case 
in the first stage, urban local authorities meet all their expenses and have greater 
flexibility in the sourcing of funds. However, grants have been on a continually sliding 
trend. This is true for the three council systems.
The three local government systems are coordinated at a provincial level. The major 
role of the provincial committee seems to be that of reporting to the centre through the 
Ministry of Local Government Rural and Urban Development on the progress and 
problems of the lower levels of government. The office of the Governor was also 
created at this level. He/she chairs the meetings of the provincial councils. But because 
this provincial forum of the PDC lacks the necessary capacity to implement plans and 
authority to make affirmative decisions, lower levels of local authorities have continued 
to look to central government who directly provide them with funds and expertise.
3.3 Stage Three : 1993(July)
Rural district council is the name of the councils brought about by the amalgamation of 
the former rural and district councils and they are governed by the Rural District Council 
Act of 1988. Besides the name, all the other structures remain the same as those that 
were operational in the two former local authorities. The DA has been sacrificed in 
favour of an employee of council as the Chief Executive of the new councils. 
Nonetheless the DA will act during the transitional one-year period as Chief Executives 
of the amalgamation.The nature of the relationship between the centre and the local 
authorities is not clear as DAs are literally disappearing from the scene. But from the 
look of it all, rural district councils are evolving towards the type of autonomy that urban 
councils or the former rural councils enjoyed in both the first and second stages of 
decentralisation. There is not, however, anything new to cheer about for the urban 
councils in this third stage. But for the rural district councils the long journey into the 
unknown has just begun.
The centre is ceding some power through small-scale incremental transfers of authority 
and responsibilities to local government. This process is reciprocated by an apparent 
withdrawal of the centre from local level affairs. The impact of this strategy on the 
performance of local authorities will be looked into in the following sections.
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4.0 LOCAL GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE: A COMPARATIVE APPRAISAL
Four local authorities were selected as case study areas in an attempt to assess the impact 
of decentralisation policy on the performance of councils. Of the four, two are in the 
rural areas (Gokwe and Harava District Councils) and the other two are in urban areas 
(Harare and Kadoma Urban Councils). Although the selection of the four was 
deliberate, the target councils had to either fall in two broad categories of: (i) good 
performers (Harare City Council and Gokwe District Council) and (ii) bad performers 
(Kadoma Town Council and Harava District Council).
Field visits to these council areas were made and extensive interviews with 
administrators, councillors, businesspeople, community leaders, line ministries officials 
and central government officers were carried out. On the basis of the information 
compiled in the field and secondary data gathered during the study, this section presents 
a comparative assessment of the performance of the selected local authorities. An 
evaluation will also be made on what areas local authorities have managed on their own 
and those on which central government, parastatals, private companies and NGOs were 
involved directly in an attempt to highlight the level of interaction of the forms of 
decentralisation in Zimbabwe and indeed the relevance of the government strategy (as 
outlined above) on decentralisation.
Three criteria have been used to measure the performance of Local Governments 
studied. These are:
(i) Resource mobilisation
(ii) Service provision
(iii) Equity in service provision
Of the three criteria above the first two will be covered extensively. Attention on the 
third criteria was concentrated on ratios or simple proportions and is implicit in the 
sections that follow. The cost and benefit of the services to households as a measure of 
equity is beyond the scope of this study.
4.1 Resource Mobilisation
Resources constitute the life-line of both the urban and district local authorities. The 
amount of resources at the disposal of the respective authorities indicates their potential 
to run their own affairs and therefore the level to which they depend on central 
government. However, the amount of disposable resources also depends on the ability 
of the local authorities to tap the resources available within their localities and/or those 
sources stipulated in the Acts that govern them.
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The above apply to both urban and district councils. Urban councils are divided into 
cities and towns, with the former having an added advantage as, besides other sources 
of revenue, they can raise money on the open money market (Harare and Bulawayo). 
District councils have different sources to those of urban councils. The revenue sources 
for the district councils only differ from one district to another where one District has 
more natural resources than the other. This notwithstanding, local authorities also have 
different "in built" abilities and capacity to raise funds from the same sources. The 
development levy is one example of the above. The potential of development levies as 
a source of revenue compared to the actual amounts collected in each of the districts 
surveyed illustrate the differing abilities of these districts. Gokwe and Harava’s average 
annual potentials are calculated at Z$340 060 and Z$82 045 respectively. Between 1988 
and 1992 Gokwe therefore expected to raise Z$1 360 240 and Harava Z$328 180. But 
the actual figures for the four-year period only amounted to Z$237 640.00 for Gokwe 
and Z$33 333 (Z$50 000 over six years) for Harava, representing 18 percent and 10 
percent of their respective potentials. Drought, methods of collection used and the 
political sensitiveness of the levy (which resembles the colonial poll tax) were cited as 
the main reasons for the shortfall.
On another note district councils tend to have the capacity to mobilise resources from 
sources other than the development levy. Beer levies have proved to be a blessing in 
disguise for Harava while Gokwe’s natural resources endowment is a gift from God. On 
beer levies which is common in the two districts, Harava has raised an average of not 
less than Z$500 000 per annum with the 1992 estimates being revised upwards to Z$624 
984 from Z$400 000 initial estimates. Gokwe on the other hand have on average 
collected less than Z$50 000 per annum.
Income-generating projects also contribute substantially to local revenue. These 
accounted for 40 percent and 28 percent of locally generated revenue in Harava and 
Gokwe respectively during the 1991-92 financial year. In the 1992-93 financial year 
Harava’s income from projects held steady at 40 percent of revenue while Gokwe’s 
surged to 53 percent of locally generated revenue (there was an almost 50 percent drop 
in locally generated income in the 1992-93 financial year).
In a nutshell the single most productive source of income for the two districts are 
different. From the breakdown above Gokwe depend more on land 
lease,income-generating projects and timber royalties which account for 15%, 28% and 
35% of the total internally generated revenue and Harava depends on beer levy and 
income from projects for slightly above 50% and 40% of the revenue income budget (at 
1992/3 financial year). Development Levies which should constitute the backbone of 
the district council resources have not reached the one percent mark of the total budget 
for Harava and is slightly above 3.5 percent for Gokwe.
Kadoma’s financial problems seem to be endemic. Only one of their accounts (beer 
account) showed surplus since the early 1980s. This account which made profits has now 
been upset by the same virus that affected the rate account and the housing account. 
Failure to repay central government loans since 1990 has meant that alternative sources 
have to be found to finance capital expenditure. To add on to the above, loan arrears 
and the backlog in the production of financial statements jeopardised any hopes the 
council had of qualifying for the World Bank sponsored Urban II project.
To instil financial discipline into the council operations a Financial Recovery Plan was
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initiated in 1990. Their failure to meet targets set for recovery and worse still the 
postponement of the target deadlines shows how the main sources of revenue, which 
are the rate fund, water fund and housing fund have failed to support the proposed plan. 
The three together contribute an average of about 67% of total revenue.
Harare depends more on the rates account which contributes slightly over 50% of total 
revenue. The second which is the water accounts only account for less than 50% of what 
the rate account contribute to revenue. Unlike in Kadoma, in Harare there is an 
over-reliance on one source of revenue. This however, indicates that there are some 
high yielding sub-accounts within the rate account.
Of the four local authorities surveyed, only Kadoma is struggling to make ends meet, 
although it is the only one with evenly distributed sources of revenue. Kadoma’s problem 
is mainly that its sources are highly vulnerable to factors like drought (water account); 
unemployment and an unexpanding industrial base (rate account) and (housing 
account). Harava is also vulnerable as its main source of revenue (beer levy) is subject 
to the continuance of the beer levy agreement. Suppose that the beer levy arrangement 
is discontinued, Harava, unlike Gokwe, will be severely disadvantaged.In other words 
Harava is more vulnerable to changes in central government’s financing policy than 
Gokwe. The latter is rich in natural resources.
4.2 Service Provision
Local authorities are entrusted by their respective Acts to provide a wide range of 
services to the people under their jurisdiction. In the main, the services provided by 
district and urban councils do not differ. The following are some of the major services 
that councils are expected to provide:
(1) Housing
(2) Sewage
(3) Roads
(4) Water supply
(5) Health services
(6) Primary education
(7) Cleaning of cities and towns and refuse collection
(8) Community centres
(9) Parks
(10) Recreational facilities
(11) Fire brigade
(12) Ambulances
(13) Creches and kindergartens etc.
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This study will deal with the first seven services, because of their direct effect on the 
people’s daily life, and also because data is relatively easily available.
4.2.1 Housing
One of the three basic needs of mankind is shelter (housing), and the local authorities 
are charged with the responsibility of providing this service to the people under their 
command. The idea is not only the provision of housing but affordable accommodation 
to different strata of the dwellers within the council’s jurisdiction.
The demand for housing in urban and district councils is quantitatively different. In the 
majority of cases rural dwellers have little requirements of the servicing of stands except 
at growth points and on other business centres. However, in the urban areas servicing 
of stands is a requirement and this adds substantially to the cost of providing 
accommodation. Housing has proved to be the most difficult service to provide in urban 
areas partly because of the above. The swelling waiting list is testimony to the above. To 
demonstrate the dimension of the problem of housing, waiting list figures have been 
used. The waiting list for Gokwe centre stands at 6 000 people and Harare and Kadoma 
have their waiting lists growing at an average per annum of 10 343 and, 2 589 people per 
annum respectively. This compares negatively to the annual housing output of 2 849 
housing units for Harare. Kadoma is virtually at a stand-still as they failed to qualify for 
the World Bank Urban II Scheme. Loans are proving difficult to come by due to 
unbalanced financial books.
On the other hand, the waiting list continues to grow. The average per household Of 
seven people (based on 1988 statistics) shows the level of overcrowding in this town of 
67 267 people. Financial difficulties proved to be the major constraint for Kadoma. 
Harare is confronted with an alarming influx of people from different directions. The 
population of Harare is growing at an annual average of 13 percent since 1982. This is 
a 10.1 percentage point over the national average population growth rate of 3.9 percent. 
Gokwe’s problem however, is that of shortage of surveyors.
Withdrawal by the centre from providing housing between 1985 and 1992 against the 
background of increasing demand reduced the efforts by urban councils to a "drop in 
the ocean". However, the intervention by government through the Ministry of Public 
Constructuion and National Housing (1992 Cluster Housing Project) albeit too late too 
little, has come as a relief to both rural and urban councils, particularly so to councils 
like Kadoma which cannot raise enough financial resources for capital development.
4.2.2 Education
This service is divided into primary and secondary education. Local authorities are 
responsible only for the provision of primary education as secondary education remains 
the responsibility of the sector ministry. However, it is important to point out that local 
authorities are only charged with the provision of the infrastructure (classrooms, 
furniture etc). The sector Ministry through per capita grants, provides the books and 
other required learning materials. Teachers as civil servants are on the payroll of the 
ministry. Only one aspect of education therefore comes up for assessment. How. have 
councils fared in providing the infrastructure?
11
Starting with the district councils it is only but fair to say that Gokwe is a relatively new 
district (see context section) compared to Harava. The demand for such infrastructure 
was/and as a rule is still high in Gokwe than in Harava. The post- independence Harava 
has yet to put up any new infrastructure for primary education as those inherited from 
the pre-independence era (14 primary schools) still meet demand. Gokwe however, had 
no proper schools before independence. There was a phenomenal growth in council 
schools in Gokwe from 1980. The district now has 225 schools, of which 199 are primary 
schools. About half of these are donor-funded. While the above indicate the capacity 
of council to provide this particular service, the preponderance of donor assistance also 
indicates the level of demand for service which council could not have met had donor 
assistance not been availed to the district.
Harare City Council has in total 27 council schools built as from 1985. Those built prior 
to this date are all government schools. The average number of classrooms per school 
is 28. With a total of approximately 266 186 children of primary school (5-14 years) going 
age, Harare cannot do without hot sitting (two sessions per each grade per day). Kadoma, 
like Harare, experiences this same problem. There are 14 primary schools in Kadoma 
leaving a deficit of 11 primary schools. For the construction of new schools the council 
charges its residences $2.00 which is collected through water charges. However, these 
resources are not adequate. All schools in Harare and Kadoma have two sessions per 
each grade (hot sitting). Harare City Council has admitted that they can no longer meet 
the demand for "dollar for dollar" scheme in the construction of schools. Hence the 
mounting pressure from both councillors and executives to abolish the scheme. The 
council is now being forced into an embarrassing situation of failing to meet their side 
of the contract.
The above notwithstanding, it is in the running and actual delivery of educational service 
that councils find themselves "crowded out" by the centre. Whereas respective councils 
Acts empower them to run schools, the Ministry of Education and Culture has and is 
still building parallel structures at the local level alienating councils in the process. To 
show discontent, Harava district council has unilaterally decided to stop receiving 
education grants from the Ministry leaving the latter to run the show.
4.2.3 Health
The spaced nature of settlement in rural areas makes the provision of services like 
health, water etc more than difficult and costly to provide. Gokwe has in total four 
hospitals (one district and three mission hospitals), and 26 clinics. Thirteen of these were 
built after 1984. Harava on the other hand, boosts of one rural hospital and 4 clinics, all 
built before 1980.
Harare has in total 32 council clinics and two hospitals (council owned), while Kadoma 
have six council clinics and one government hospital. It was clearly indicated during the 
survey that demand for health is very high and councils cannot meet it. Assuming that a 
standard 1 000 houses per clinic is taken as a measure, it would mean that Harare alone 
would need 76 clinics, Kadoma nine clinics, Gokwe 37 and Harava five as compared to 
the current 32; five; 26 and four respectively. However, if the number of people per 
house is considered the above figures would definitely be revised upwards.
As is the case in education, local authorities provide the infrastructure and the needed 
equipment. Essential drugs and salaries for the health staff are settled from government
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grants through the Ministry of Health. Nonetheless, central government policy on free 
health service for those earning less than Z$400.00 per month has not worked in favour 
of local authorities. While on one hand council hospitals and clinics fulfil forthwith the 
imperatives of this national policy, the centre does not, on the other hand, always 
recompense the full costs of the service local authorities would have provided in advance 
on behalf of the centre. The above relationship upsets the budgetary position of councils 
and their ability to provide the same service in future.
4.2.4 Roads, Water Supply and Sewage
There is a great difference between rural and urban councils in terms of what they can 
do in providing these services. Urban councils are responsible for the provision of these 
services from the design to actual development and their maintenance. The provision 
of water and sanitation services is in fact done before any settlement commences. In 
other words, it is what is generally termed servicing of stands. The councils normally 
contract out to private companies most of the work that they do not have capacity to 
perform. As in the health service, the centre takes long to reimburse local authorities 
for maintaining state roads that pass through their jurisdiction. Urban councils are 
mostly affected in this regard.
Water reticulation system and supply is excellent in all urban areas. Ninety nine percent 
and 94.8 percent of Harare and Kadoma’s population have access to piped water. 
However, Kadoma unlike Harare (which is currently refurbishing its water purification 
system), has to make do with a system which is now very costly to operate due to the 
constant break-down of the old equipment. The water crisis is looming on the horizon 
in this town. This also goes with the sewage system and the local road network. Harare 
has an upper hand on the provision of roads and their maintenance. By qualifying for 
the World Bank Urban II projects, Harare City Council is in a much better position to 
deal with its needs than Kadoma.
District councils have no capacity to provide the required road services and water to 
their populace. Of all the road network of more than 120 km and 1 400 km for Harava 
and Gokwe respectively, all have been constructed by the State and/or by the District 
Development Fund(DDF). About 96 percent and 62 percent of the population within 
Harava and Gokwe councils respectively have access to either piped or borehole water. 
This by African standards is highly commendable. However, these statistics do not point 
to the capacity of council to deliver the goods. Almost 99 percent of the boreholes are 
donor-funded and have been drilled by DDF and/or by the sector Ministry. The 
remainder is funded either by council or by self-help schemes by the villagers in need 
of the service. The capacity problem of the district councils does not only hinge on the 
lack of the required equipment and monetary resources but also on the needed human 
resources to deal with civil engineering work needed to put up such facilities and/or 
supervise the contractors. Suffice it to say that district councils only have limited capacity 
to maintain some of the installed or developed infrastructure but are handicapped in 
terms of the actual provision of the service.
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4.2.5 Cleaning o f Cities/Towns and Refuse Collection
This is a contentious issue in urban council areas visited. It is contentious in the sense 
that the thrust on preventive rather than curative approach to health and environment 
protection also comes into light. What comes into mind here are two issues: first is the 
ability of the system to provide the service and second, the existence of problematic 
areas or spots. Removal of refuse in Harare, although a problem, remains under control 
(with the introduction of about 31 new bedford trucks 1992) and can still manage to 
service its suburbs once a week, something which Kadoma admittedly was no longer 
able to do as its fleet is dilapidated. Assistance is sometimes sought from private 
companies (Art Corporation in particular) whenever the situation gets out of hand. The 
failure of Kadoma to qualify for the Urban II World Bank programmes in which the 
procurement of refuse removal vehicles was budgeted for compounded the situation.
Problems are however also encountered in the vacant spaces where residents dump 
excess refuse. Street cleaning continue to give problems. The situation is being 
complicated by vagrants and the retrenchment of cleaners. Harare has its own problems 
with specific spots like Mbare Musika. The spot is reported almost on a yearly basis in 
the Department of Health Report as the potential health hazard area.
This is not a service that district councils would usually worry about. However, Gokwe 
centre unlike Dema growth point (Harava) is fast growing into one of the most dynamic 
rural towns, hence the growing need for such a service. It is from such specialised services 
that the district council is arguing for a Town Management Board to be put in place. In 
trying to stand to the new challenge the district council has mobilised business people 
at the centre to meet the cost of the refuse collection.
5.0 DETERMINANT VARIABLES: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FACTORS
The output of local authorities is a function of many intertwined factors, both internal 
and external to them. The internal factors explain the absorptive and administrative 
capacity of the local government authorities i.e, their ability as corporate entities to 
provide the services to their constituencies. These will be referred to in this study as 
direct variables. Included in this class of variables therefore are the local government 
resources (buildings, finances, staff, equipment projects) and local government internal 
administrative system (auditing, planning, work programming, personnel management, 
incentives, communication).
Consequently, local government output is realised within a determined environment, in 
other words, there is constant interaction with external elements to themselves. 
Indirectly, these influence the methods of production, shape, type and size of the output 
from local authorities. For easy reference they will be addressed to as indirect variables. 
Local government policies, inter-organisational relationships and group politics are the 
main elements that will be looked at in this section.
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5.1 Direct Variables
5.1.1 Material, Financial and Human Resources
The availability (or lack of) of these resources explain the level of capacity built at the 
local level to respond to the demand from their respective constituencies. These 
resources impact directly on the output or performance of local councils.
5.1.1.1 Administrative Buildings
All local authorities visited indicated that this was not a problem as they all owned the 
administrative buildings they operate from. Rent is still chargeable to cover expenses 
incurred on premises in order to show the true cost of the service.
5.1.1.2 Staff
Staffing levels depend on the size of the local authority in question. Generally, urban 
local authorities employ more staff than district councils. But the indicator for instability 
of staff establishments is found in the rate of turnover rather than establishment sizes 
of the respective authorities. Entry qualifications for the different grades of staff are set 
at the national level.
Over the past 13 years the turnover rates varied from one local authority to another 
albeit some similar patterns exist in district councils and in urban councils. The 
categories of staff affected also differed. In Gokwe high rates of turn over were 
registered in the nursing category, followed by the officers grade and the general hands. 
Harava’s most affected groups are those of officers and the clerical staff in that order. 
The high rate in the nursing staff category in Gokwe was attributed to lack of 
accommodation and the poor general working conditions (electricity, water, transport 
etc.). For the general hands low wages were cited as the major cause. The officers grade 
employees identified lack of promotion prospects (one can be on the ceiling 
indefinitely), low salaries and lack of incentives as the major contributory factors to the 
instability in this category. The reasons for this high turnover rate in this grade were 
similar in the two districts surveyed. Dishonesty ranks very high on the list of possible 
causes for the high rate of turnover in the clerical category in Harava.
There is, however, a different pattern in which the turnover rate is affected in urban 
areas. Instead of a whole category of staff being affected, individual departments tend 
to be the victims. It was observed that although the rate of turnover was high across the 
board in the early 1980s as Whites left councils, the situation has stabilised. The 
department of works for both Harare and Kadoma have been singled out as the most 
affected over the past 13 years. Experienced engineers and surveyors come out as the 
categories which are most affected. However, the engineering category tends to be 
stabilising currently. The Treasurer’s department in Kadoma was also seriously affected 
because of the scarcity of these skills during the late 1980s and early 1990s. The relative 
scarcity of these skills (nationally) over the past years meant that councils were forced 
to compete in terms of salaries and incentives on the labour market against the 
parastatals and the private sector. While competing with parastatals is no longer a 
problem for Harare and Kadoma, limits on how far their resources can stretch means
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that the private sector remains unbeatable.
5.1.1.3 Finances
Own finances provide a measure of the ability and/or lack of it of local authorities to 
support their own plans and policies on one hand and the level of dependence on the 
donor community and the central government on the other hand. Finances in all the 
four local councils interviewed were said to be inadequate. While it is universally 
understood that funds are never enough it is important to assess the relationship of the 
income and expenditure of the local authorities under consideration in order to have a 
clear picture of the (in)adequacy of these resources. The accumulated budget deficit of 
Kadoma town represents 36% of the total revenue for 1992/93, and Harare’s 
accumulated deficit accounts for 11% of the total income (1991 budget). Gokwe and 
Harava districts have accumulated a deficit and surplus of 5% and 2% of their total 
incomes for 1992/93 financial year respectively.
Outstanding loans show the potential of local authorities to engage in capital 
expenditure as these constitute the major source for capital investment. If only loans 
owed to the National Housing Fund can be considered, Kadoma’s arrear instalment of 
$2 704 274.05 represents 21% of the total of $13 092 992.38. Arrear instalments for 
Harare and Gokwe represents 0.6% and 10% of their respective total outstanding loan 
of $86 649 386.97 and $887 988.73 respectively.
Although finances are not adequate in all urban and district councils, Kadoma seems to 
be in an unenviable position. The ability to implement own policies, plans and develop 
capital infrastructure is very restricted in Kadoma than in the other three local 
authorities. Harava District Council is the only one with a healthy budget. While Harare 
City Council and Gokwe District Council have registered deficits, these are manageable 
compared to that registered by the Kadoma Town Council on one hand. On the other 
hand Kadoma cannot meet the criteria set for urban councils to qualify for donor aid 
and simultaneously state assistance to urban councils is minimal.
5.1.1.4 Equipment
The type and quantity of equipment the councils own is an indication of what the councils 
can do on their own and how they can do it. All the local authorities have what is needed 
in terms of transport (trucks and small vehicles) to facilitate the day-to-day running of 
their councils (see tables). District councils are incapacitated when it comes to 
construction of dams, feeder roads and boreholes as the needed equipment are not 
available. All they have in this respect is a tractor-drawn grader for Harava and Universal 
grader for Gokwe. The most that can be done by these two is the maintenance work on 
the feeder roads.
Kadoma urban does not even own the tractor drawn grader making it impossible to 
maintain its roads. Although Harare has a considerable pool of graders and caterpillars, 
front loaders, compressors etc, they fall far short of what is required. However the two 
urban councils, unlike the districts, possess the required technical capacity to put 
together and supervise contracted work. While Harava and Gokwe (although the 
capacity is being developed in Gokwe) can also contract out some works, this is done at 
a very small scale.
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Local councils can have access to the technical expertise and equipment assembled at 
the central level. District councils have benefited since 1980 from the District 
Development Fund (and line ministries) technical expertise and equipment for the 
construction of roads, boreholes and wells. Urban councils also benefit from line 
ministries’ interventions in housing, national roads etc. But the benefit is not translated 
into capacity building at the local level as the planning, implementation, co-ordination 
and supervision of these projects is exclusively done at the centre.
There is an array of other types of equipment that councils need in order to provide 
efficient service to their constituencies besides the heavy equipment. Looking through 
the list of equipment one can observe that there is a predominance of tractors on the 
equipment list of Kadoma and water engines on that of Gokwe. Tractors are mainly used 
for refuse collection in Kadoma as they do not have the conventional refuse collector 
trucks. However, they are an old fleet which is constantly grounded due to breakdowns. 
The water engines for Gokwe simply stress the shortage of water in this district, and 
more so at the busy Gokwe Centre.
Another type of equipment which cannot be overlooked for its importance are the 
ambulances. The only council out of those surveyed that has been unable to acquire an 
ambulance is Gokwe. This has been on their plans for quite some time now but resources 
to purchase at least one are hard to come-by. Harava and Kadoma have one and two 
respectively and no information was obtained for Harare. It has not been assessed 
whether the above are adequate for their constituencies.
Not mentioned or listed are the office equipment. Harare is computerised while 
Kadoma is struggling with its old franking machines, making it virtually impossible to 
keep pace with the defaulting rate payers. The whole system of resource mobilisation is 
being negatively affected, reducing the revenue inflow levels and worsening the 
budgetary position of council in the process. Typewriters and duplicating machines are 
well within reach of many Councils.
5.1.2 Local Government Internal Administration: Internal Logic
The support system of council has its operational logic which will be addressed to as the 
internal administration of council. This looks at the planning system, auditing, work 
programming, monitoring, reviewing of plans, personnel management 
(recruiting/appraisal, incentives) and communication/meetings. The aim of this section 
is to establish the areas and extent of involvement by the centre in the running of local 
councils and the reciprocal relationship which this involvement generates.
5.1.2,1 Planning
A bottom-up approach is on the centre of the district planning system. The process starts 
by compiling an inventory of required projects at village level (VIDCO see section 3.0 
for definition). These are channelled through councillors who are representatives of the 
Wards, to Council. H ie planning committee of council with the technical help from the 
Executive Officer (planning) sifts the projects and set priorities according to the needs 
of the respective wards. Projects from council administration are married with projects 
from the respective wards to come up with a District inventory of projects which is 
submitted for discussion to a full council meeting. This is chaired by the council
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chairman. These projects are then sent to the District Development Committee which 
is the institution with the mandate to put together a district plan.
All heads of sector ministries, parastatals etc. operating within the district and executive 
officers of Council attend this meeting and their projects are put together with those of 
the council administration. The District Administrator, as the Chief Executive of 
Council, chairs the meeting. Before the final draft is sent to the centre via the province 
for final approval, a joint council - DCC meeting is held to verify the final draft and give 
it their blessings. It is at this stage (district), through the DDC that the top-down and 
the bottom-up systems of planning are fussed as the sector ministries incorporate their 
own projects for the district into the plan. At the provincial level district plans are 
consolidated into the provincial plans. Priorities are also set for funding of district plans 
from the PSIP vote or from donor funds.
In urban areas the process of planning is supposed to be decentralised to the 
neighbourhood committees, Wardco (but none of the interviewed residents knew of 
these institutions). Councillors in urban areas make use of party structures to 
communicate with their constituencies than the developmental ones. Respective 
council departments as a rule do the planning for the urban communities. Each 
department of council produces its own plan which is then discussed by the relevant 
committees of council. From there the plan is reviewed and verified by full council.
The unified plan of council is expressed in financial terms in the form of a budget. There 
are no DDCs in urban councils. The budget is sent direct to the centre for approval.
5.1.2,2 Work Programming
Work programming by council reveals the link between the policy and its 
implementation. It has been observed that veiy little of what has been planned for is 
implemented. District councils, like their urban counterparts, take projects that the 
council as a corporate body feels are a priority for the district as a whole. These are 
projects which the council’s resources can support. In other words, this exercise consists 
of matching the desired objectives with the available means to achieve them. The council 
budget is therefore formulated out of this combination.
Urban authorities are faced with the same problem of coordinating the resources with 
the planned for projects. Scarcity of resources always militates against the intention of 
planners and implementors. To go round the problem, prioritisation of projects and/or 
project ranking has to be done. This is inevitable as there are always too many needs 
chasing scarce resources. Their budgets are therefore a reflection of the above 
relationship.
Councils’ priorities have been biased towards income generating projects in the districts 
surveyed, with particular reference to Harava. Ward projects were mainly left for sector 
ministries, donor agencies and self-help schemes. The councils argue that development 
levies are the main source of ward projects. But as has been observed, very little has 
been raised from levies. To make the situation worse, sector ministry budgets are 
minimal, or are administrative in nature. Planning at this stage therefore lacks substance 
relegating it to a mere shopping list. The DDC is, as a rule, reduced to a co-ordinative 
instrument.
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5.1.2.3 Auditing
The auditing of books is a requirement that local authorities cannot do without as large 
sums of money are generated and expended (see budgets) in recurrent expenses and 
capital projects. The district council books are audited by the parent ministry 
(MLRUD), while the urban councils have their books audited by the Urban 
Development Corporation (URDCO), a parastatal falling under the Ministry of Local 
Government, Rural and Urban Development. The district councils seem to be satisfied 
with this arrangement. The main reason being the non-payment of fees, as they would 
not afford the URDCO fees or those charged by private companies.
Kadoma and Harare felt otherwise. They argued that the question of who should audit 
their books must be left open to the local authorities concerned. However, their feelings 
do not show any dissatisfaction with the service they get from URDCO. The assumption 
they entertain is that if different auditing companies are allowed to compete for the 
service the balance in fees would tilt in favour of local authorities. This also has to do 
with the fact that they pay for their auditing service and value for money could only be 
assessed in a free for all situation rather than under a monopoly situation which is 
currently the order.
5.1.2.4 Personnel Management
The responsibility for recruitment of staff is divided between the centre and the local 
councils. This relationship is the same for district councils and urban councils. District 
councils have the responsibility and authority to hire and fire all the support staff to the 
clerical level. For officers’ posts normal channels of recruiting staff are followed and the 
short-listed applicants are sent to central government for vetting and approval. The 
urban authorities, only differ with the district councils in this respect in that only the 
heads of departments are vetted and approved by the centre. Both the district and the 
urban councils are in favour of this relationship. It is seen as a necessary evil because 
the exercise weeds out the criminal elements (in the case of district councils) as the 
records on all current and former council employees are with the Ministry. The vetting 
process also eliminates any nepotism or favouritism which might arise if the (urban) 
councils had the final say.
The area of contention between the local authorities and the centre in recruiting staff 
is the length of time that takes the centre to approve the proposed candidates. This, 
according to the councils, affects their operations negatively and in certain cases means 
losing the candidate to other organisations. It was also observed that the delays may not 
be blamed on the centre only as concerned councils sometimes do not furnish the centre 
with all the relevant documents. In both circumstances the whole process has to be 
revisited all over again.
Qualification and experience are the major criteria that are considered in recruiting and 
appointing the staff in councils. At least a National Diploma in Local Government and 
University degree are considered the minimum academic qualifications for executive 
officers in districts and heads of departments in urban councils respectively. Incentives 
are a major problem in local authorities. These range from basic salaries (district 
councils) which are considered to be very low, to limited promotion prospects, lack of 
allowance etc. Lack of incentives is seen as the major factor contributing to the high 
rate of turnover, particularly in the senior officers grades. District council executive
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Officers and their deputies have their salaries paid from government grants and much 
as the councils would want to pay allowances (as incentives) to the officers, this has to 
be sanctioned by the centre (which has so far been reluctant to allow councils to give 
their employees incentive packages). Urban local authorities enjoy some flexibility in 
this regard. The salaries for urban senior.staff (unlike those at the district) are exclusively 
paid by the councils. Incentive packages are also attached to the relevant posts although 
the resources factor puts some limits on how much the councils can offer.
5.1.2,5 Communication
There are scheduled meetings, and each member of staff has a copy of the schedule. 
However, members of staff are reminded of the meetings before the day. This applies 
to all the meetings of council, departmental meetings, inter-departmental meetings, 
council committee meetings and full council meetings. Emergency meetings if any are 
arranged as the situation demands. The respective councils are responsible for the 
calling of meetings.
5.2 Indirect Variables
Indirect variables explain how local authorities interact with other corporate bodies 
(central government included) that are involved in the development of the local 
authorities’ areas. The powers and responsibilities delegated to local authorities will be 
reviewed in this section in an attempt to illuminate on the relationship between the 
legislative Acts and the actual situation on the ground.
5.2.1 Local Government Policies
Values and goals are critical to policy making and are central to the choice of decisions 
and alternatives. However, value judgement and indeed goal setting are inherently 
based on subject preferences, beliefs, ideologies and commitments. Looked at 
institutionally, the difficulty lies in applying professional criteria to an activity which 
belongs to the ’legitimate value judges’, that is, the politicians and the polity as a whole. 
The main question that could be asked therefore is who makes policies for councils? To 
provide an adequate answer it is necessary to understand briefly what policy and policy 
formulation mean. Another important ingredient to be singled out is the context in which 
policy making and policy formulation are realised.
Policy making is not more than coming up with a strategy which spells out a definite 
course, a method of action selected from among alternatives and in the light of given 
conditions, to guide and usually determine present and future decisions. Consequently, 
the formulation of policy is an act of putting together a projected programme consisting 
of derived objectives and means to achieve them. The two are not mutually exclusive 
but the latter is the crystallisation of the former.
Local authorities put together policies for the development of their council areas but 
this is done within the framework of an Act of Parliament that governs the respective 
local governments. Anything outside what is provided for in these Acts is not permissible 
and calls for investigation by the centre.
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Councils, both district and urban seem to enjoy a high degree of autonomy in making 
and formulating policies. An elected body of councillors (full council) is the organ that 
makes policy at the District and urban council level. The difference between the two 
councils lies in that,besides the councillors and their executive officers, a representative 
of central government, the District Administrator, participates in full council meetings 
in his capacity as the Chief Executive of the district council. However, all the executives 
sit in these meetings as advisors to council with the DA as the chief advisor. They do not 
have the voting power, which only the elected councillors have. Urban councils have the 
town clerk as their chief advisor. He/she is a permanent council employee. As in district 
councils, executive officers do not have the right to vote. Consequently, for the executive 
to influence policy it has to lobby the councillors before the full council meeting or 
during their presentations in council meetings.
The respective committees of council (which include finance committee; education; 
health; general purpose and administration committee, planning committee etc.) are 
the organs of council that put together the policies for council. The finance committee 
is the only one which is provided for by the Act, and council is empowered to form as 
many committees as they deem necessary for the running of council. The Mayor (urban) 
or DA and Senior Executive Officers (district) are required by law to attend the meetings 
of the finance committee. The committee chairmen present their business in full council 
which is chaired by the mayor, or, the council chairman. Consensus has to be reached 
for committee’s presentation to be implemented. If consensus is not reached then a 
vote will suffice. This system works well in local authorities where there is less external 
influence.
This notwithstanding, before the policies adopted by full council are implemented, they 
are sent for final approval by central government through the province (in the case of 
district councils). The executive arm of council implements these policies once they are 
approved, with reviews and appraisals done by the respective committees on behalf of 
full council.
None of the surveyed local authorities has had their proposed policies turned down or 
changed in any way by the centre. This could be an indication that at least none of them 
has proposed anything that is outside the context provided for by their respective Acts. 
Whether this means autonomy depends on how one would want to interpret it. But the 
safest bet is that it is "guided autonomy", ie. setting improvement in value judgement 
and goal setting not by intervening with their basis and justification but by structuring 
the field within which value judgement and goal setting must take place in order to be 
relevant to policy making.
5.2.2 Inter-organisational Relationship
Relationships between the centre and local authorities is the subject of this section. 
More squarely it will look into the following issues:
-  type of activities from the centre to local government or the type of activities for 
which authority is shifted;
-  type of powers or authority which is decentralised;
-  levels to which power(s) is/are transferred;
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the individuals or organisations to whom the power(s) and activities is/are delegated; 
and
the means of transfer.
As discussed earlier on, decentralisation takes many forms and all these forms are not 
mutually exclusive; they reinforce each other in practice. They can only theoretically be 
separated one from the other for the purpose of analysis. Thus relations which develop 
between the centre and the local authorities (as corporate bodies) are therefore not 
more than an expression of the concatenation of the different varieties of these different 
forms of decentralisation.
5.2.2,1 Power and Authority
District and urban councils are empowered by the Act of Parliament (District Councils
Act and Urban Councils Act) to perform a number of functions and also certain powers
are conferred on them. The following are the functions and areas which councils have
the power and authority within the law to perform:
— Call elections within their spatial unit;
— Elect their own chairman from the elected councillors;
— Carry out any act the council feels necessary or desirable in the interests of all or 
some of the inhabitants;
— Develop the council area, ie. prepare, implement and monitor development plans 
and policies within the council areas;
— Charge owners and occupiers of land within councils such amounts as the council 
may fix in respect of property let by council, or fixed deposits payable in connection 
with any services provided by council;
— Impose a land development levy upon all who are owners of rural land within the 
council area, owners of mining operations, or licensed dealers who carry on business 
within the jurisdiction of council;
— Incur any expenditure not exceeding $200.00 (District Council) without seeking 
approval; and
— Recruitment of support staff and senior staff.
However the approval of the minister is a requirement stipulated in the respective Acts 
of local governments.
5.2.2,2 Sector Ministries
Sector ministries have field officers at the district level who implement the line 
ministries projects and provide the necessary feedback to their headquarters. While the 
officials are responsible for the implementation of their line ministries projects and the 
provision of services, they do not have the power to make decisions. That power resides 
with the ministry’s head office. Parastatal organisations as well have the same mode of 
operation. More interesting though is the fact that the field officers from ministries and 
parastatals are not in anyway answerable (administratively and operationally) to council,
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which is the policy making body at the district level. This creates a variety of problems 
for the districts’ policies in areas like education and health and the implementation of 
the district plan.
5.2.2,3 The District Administrator
The office of the District Administrator comes into light when coordination of the 
activities of the line ministries and parastatals at the district level is raised. Who is the 
District Administrator and what is his role?
The District Administrator is the senior government representative at the district level, 
and with his staff they are the most important link between the government and the rural 
population. Their task is two pronged: first, they inform the population about 
government policy and encourage them to accept agricultural and other development 
practices; and second, the population channel their grievances, local needs and 
aspirations to government through the DA’s office. Justifiably constant appeals are 
made to him for advice on the most desirable way to approach problems and to deal with 
the rural population. The DA arbitrates in may local disputes between individuals (eg. 
land), between traditional leaders and their subjects, between officials and the public 
etc.
More importantly though, the DA is on the centre of district affairs. As the Chief 
Executive of the District Council she/he is one of the signatory of the council cheques. 
She/he also attends the meeting of the Finance Committee. District Development 
Committee meetings and the joint DDC and Council meetings are chaired by the DA. 
In this role his/her office coordinates the departmental activities of line ministries and 
parastatals with those of the districts administration. The former organisations however, 
are not under the supervision of the DA. The activities of the District Development 
Fund (a quasi-governmental institution) are coordinated from the DA’s office.
The relationship between the DA and the Senior Executive Officer (Head of the District 
Administration) is a delicate one. Discord cannot be avoided at the district level if there 
is no good communication between the two. The unfortunate thing is that once a 
situation of discord prevails councillors tend to listen to the DA than to their employee. 
In spite of the above, the fact that at this crucial stage (district level) there is no one with 
authority to respond to proposals from below makes the position of the DA more 
co-ordinative than authoritative. The major handicap of this office however is that it 
only receives an administrative budget and the impact of the DA on the progressive 
development of the area is minimal.But even with the reduced powers of this office (eg. 
death and birth certificates, salaries for teachers etc. are no longer under the DA’s 
office), the tradition and prestige which was built up around this office during colonial 
days persist.
Urban areas, although some of them fall within the spatial unit under the DA’s office, 
are not themselves under his/her jurisdiction. The Urban Councils Act that governs the 
cities/and towns does not have the provision for a DA. The chief adviser to Council is 
the Town Clerk who is the most senior employee of Council. However the other 
structures, from the neighbourhood committees to council, are moulded along those of 
districts. This also goes with functions and powers delegated to the council serve for 
very few areas. The Urban Councils Act does not restrict urban councils particularly 
cities to specified sources of revenue. Towns however, cannot raise financial resources 
on the open market like their counterparts (cities of Harare and Bulawayo).
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The role of central government takes different shades with respect to the two types of 
local authorities. Control, co-ordinative, supportive and supervisory were all mentioned 
when interviewees were asked to characterise the relationship between the district 
council and the centre. In urban areas, the relations were characterised as those of 
monitoring and control.
5.2.3 Group Politics
Council business is influenced by different actors. It is therefore important at this stage 
to highlight the possible channels through which council politics is influenced, either 
from below or from above.
Three channels of communication are functional at the district level while only two exist 
in urban councils. The traditional hierarchical line of communication starts with the 
Kraal head to the Headman and the Chief. Party structures commence with the cell, 
branch and district level, while the Planning structure starts with the Video, Wardco to 
the DDC. The latter two lines of communication represent the political and 
developmental needs of the people respectively.
But notwithstanding the seemingly clear division of responsibilities between the two 
(party and planning structures), there is marriage or a fusion of the two systems at the 
Ward level. Ward councillors are elected on a party ticket. In other words it is safe to 
say that they are mandated to advancing the developmental policy of their parties at the 
district or urban council level. Councillors are therefore accountable to two masters ie. 
the electorate and the party supremos (assuming that the agenda of the party supremos 
is different from that of the local constituency). If the increased numbers of candidates 
(ZANU PF members) standing for elections as independents can be taken as a measure 
of the divergence of agenda between the two, then the issue of wearing two hats becomes 
difficult to dismiss. Imposition of candidates has been singled out as the main reason for 
the emergence of the independents.
The argument that council policies are externally influenced also gains credibility. In 
local governments surveyed, independents were observed in Harare and Harava. It is in 
these same local authorities that possible external influence in policy making was 
recorded. Surprisingly however, these allegations were made by executive officers while 
the councillors who are in the main, victims of such machinations, answered otherwise.
5.2.3,1 Composition of Councillors
Other possible sources of political influence were observed and looked into. These 
included the class composition of councillors and "absentee councillors". The 
composition of councillors was noted as a potential source of influence on the direction 
and nature of policies made and formulated by council. Gokwe councillors are 
predominantly peasant farmers and about 62 percent peasant farmers in Harava. Of the 
two urban local authorities Harare had a bigger share of its councillors made up of 
business people and Kadoma’s were a mixed bag dominated by the middle management 
level.
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The business minded approach to policy development (and easy access to the corridors 
of power for Harare) in Harare and Harava can also be attributed to the composition 
of their respective councils. The thrust in Harava is on the development of income 
generating projects while Harare emphasises on cost recovery for service provided. The 
failure to raise the development levy (only $50 000 was raised from 1986) can also be 
credited to the above factor as the lack of resources was ruled out as the constraint to 
raising revenue from development levy by both the agricultural extension (Agritex) 
official in the area and the Executive Officers. Political resistance to the levy was 
mentioned by councillors and executives. A lack of a coordinated political mobilisation 
campaign gains credibility. The development of Dema Growth Point (a growth centre 
in Harava District) could also be attributed to the resistance by the local business 
community to competing investors as its proximity to Harare and the growth point 
incentives would have worked to its advantage than otherwise.
Statistics have shown that Gokwe did not fare better in the collection of the levy. The 
reason for the poor showing has been put as that of successive droughts and the method 
of collection used. But one important factor has also emerged which shows the dynamics 
of different groups in trying to influence policy. The phenomenal growth of Gokwe 
Centre has been attributed to the campaign by the peasant councillors to attract "external 
investors" from Kwekwe and Kadoma. Although this move upset the indigenous 
business people, the locals have seen the coming of the external investors as a stabilising 
factor as competition brought down prices and goods to the district. This has worked to 
the advantage of the local community who do not have to go to Kwekwe to buy groceries, 
agricultural inputs etc. It has been however, a nightmare to the indigenous business 
people who, faced by the influx of the big business and the insensitiveness of council to 
their pleas and problems, formed the Gokwe Business Association to try and influence 
council politics’ from below.
The argument by the indigenous businessmen, though, is valid. While the influx of 
external investors stabilises the prices and increases the access of goods, to locals, it also 
drives the indigenous business people out of business in the process. They argue that 
prices could also be stabilised if the external investors invest their capital in the 
manufacturing of the different products right at the centre, and leave them to do the 
retailing. The financial resource base for council is increased, employment created and 
industrial development of the district strengthened in the process. In other words they 
are against external investors as long as they invest in the retail sector. However, the 
politics rage on. A new dimension is emerging. The rapid expansion of Gokwe Centre 
is threatening surrounding peasants, as they will eventually give way to the expanding 
rural town. Signals of resistance are already flashing - as some councillors are 
campaigning against Gokwe applying for town status.
Kadoma seems to be a special case. The predominance of the middle class (without 
enough political of economic clout) has failed to draw sympathy from politicians in 
Harare.Investment, as a rule, is static and the rate of unemployment is on the increase. 
Although some solidarity has been developed between the councillors and the 
executives, it is best to be termed "solidarity in poverty". The political thrust which unites 
the two forces and its possible implications on the council was captured by the Chairman 
of the finance committee in 1990/91 when he noted that "the quality of our leadership 
shall be judged not by the extent to which we shy away from reality, but by the extent to 
which we are courageous enough to face our citizens and convey to them in very cheap 
terms the reality of our finance situation and that they have to respond appropriately".
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5.2.3.2 Resident Councillors Versus Absentee Councillors
Another point of contention was whether by residing in the areas they represent 
councillors are prone to more or less pressure from external or internal forces. Two lines 
of arguments were noted. The argument is that councillors who live in their wards 
understand the feelings and problems of (and identify with) their people more than the 
ones who only come to address rallies. A counter argument and mostly from the 
"absentee councillors" (those who do not reside in the wards they represent) was that 
the calibre of the councillors is what matters. In line with the above arguments the study 
noted that of all the areas where councillors resided in their wards there was a favourable 
response to meetings of council than in areas where there are "absentee councillors." It 
was also pointed out that those who live outside their wards were more prone to external 
than internal influence. This is, nevertheless, difficult if not impossible to substantiate.
5.2.3.3 Traditional Structures
The traditional structures of communication were at 1980 demobilised of the source of 
their influence. The judicial powers they possessed before independence and the 
traditional authority over land and its distribution/allocation and the power to resolve 
land disputes etc were all invested in the new judicial structures under the Ministry of 
Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, and in the President (who is represented at the 
local level by the councillor, the DA and PA respectively depending on the hierarchical 
level in question). This notwithstanding relations were maintained between the three 
structures as the traditional structure still commanded legitimacy in the eyes of the rural 
people. The land allocation method and the change in the method of mobilising 
development levy testifies to the above.
Chiefs and Headmen are involved in the identification of land (as traditional boundaries 
still hold) before councillors put their final stamp. The unyielding development levy is 
more likely to be influenced by the traditional structures than by promises for future 
development. It could be from the realisation that district councils are consistently 
failing to raise more than half of the planned targets that they have now empowered the 
Headmen to collect the development levy. Previously councillors collected levies 
during rallies but not much was forthcoming. Although the results are not yet visible 
there is no doubt that councils have now realised that this new strategy coupled with 
political mobilisation is the only way out. The disbursement of the mobilised resources 
still remains the perserve of the development structures. The possibility of a strong 
influence from the traditional structures on constraining development can not be ruled 
out.
Chiefs also sit in council meetings as ex-officio members. Of late government is restoring 
limited judiciary powers to the chiefs, a move seen by many as a result of the pressure 
mounted from below.
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6.0 IMPACT OF DECENTRALISATION ON THE PERFORMANCE OF LOCAL 
AUTHORITIES
The impact of decentralisation policy on local authorities’ performance can only be 
assessed from the changes which occurred to two important indicators discussed in the 
early sections of this article. First is the ability of local authorities to mobilise internal 
resources and, second, is the provision of different services to their communities. A clear 
distinction should however be made between the focus of this section - namely 
measurement of the effect - and the major concern of the public, that is effectiveness. 
"What happened and to what extent" - as opposed to - "Was what happened desirable?" 
- is the concern of this section.
The factors that contribute to the changes in performance indicators have also been 
discussed in the preceding sections, and in particular the section on "Determinant 
Variables", both internal and external. Correlationship between performance and these 
variables therefore becomes very important in appraising and interpreting the level and 
meaning of the changes recorded in the different indicators.
6.1 Local Authorities’ Finances and the Role of the State
Two important questions need to be asked at this juncture: Who should fund 
decentralisation - the state or local authorities? Does more decentralisation mean more 
financial resources at the local level? These questions also bring in contention the 
devolution - deconcentration dichotomy, where the local level structures (mostly the 
technocrats) are arguing for more powers and at the centre, small-scale incremental 
dispersion of functions and power is favoured.
Over the years (from 1980) local governments have developed the capacity to mobilise 
internal resources (increased revenue from income generating projects, development 
levy etc.) albeit they continue to depend on the state coffers for their financial needs. 
The average dependence rate for district and urban councils is around 44% and 3% 
respectively. For district councils there is a remarkable decrease in the dependence 
ratio, from 90% (Wekwete, 1988) during much of the first half of the 1980s. However, 
this equation does not imply that district councils can stand on their own once the Central 
Government withdraws its involvement. To the contrary it means that the state has been 
decentralising responsibilities without equally distributing the resources to match them. 
Income generating projects and other indirect revenue yielding schemes improvised by 
the state (e.g. beer levy) and' the intervention of donor agencies have in a way 
compensated for the void created by falling grants from the centre.
In urban councils the dependence ratio is considerably low and there was a downward 
movement in the dependence ration of 3.7% in 1981-83 (ibid). However, support from 
the centre is concentrated in such sensitive areas as health and education. The constant 
decrease of these grants affected the budgetary position of urban councils. 
Cross-subsidisation of different individual accounts of council, to make for the falling 
grants, has only served to weaken the viable accounts, negatively affecting the capacity 
of council to revitalise the once viable accounts.
27
The assumption on which the above relationship between the state and local authorities 
is built is that the more responsibilities the centre delegates to the local levels the more 
the pressure on them (local authorities) to deliver and/or to source for revenues from 
other alternative sources like income generating projects and alternatively from donor 
agencies. The establishment of the department of Planning (on the encouragement of 
the centre) whose staff salaries are not covered by government grants points to the 
validity of this assumption.
6.1.1 State Monopoly of Fiscal Revenue and Expenditure Power
The centre still monopolises fiscal revenue and expenditure power. The monopoly is 
manifest in two ways. First is that the centre approves any price adjustments which local 
authorities recommend in an attempt to strike an economic balance between the cost 
of providing the service and the actual market price of the service. This deprives the 
local authorities of the flexibility to timely mobilise the planned resources, resulting in 
crippling budget deficits, shelving of planned projects and/or provision of substandard 
services. It is the cost and benefit of this approach to both councils and central 
government that needs to be addressed. Secondly, the centre does not have a formula 
of sharing the resources that accrue to its coffers from different taxes with the local 
authorities. By denying local authorities a share of the resources raised in their areas the 
centre is overlooking the overwhelming need to involve the respective local 
communities in managing and making use of their own resources.
Technocrats are undermined in  the process, hence their consistent call for a devolved 
form of decentralisation which combine responsibilities and fiscal power. Conversely 
politicians at the local level acceded to the deconcentrated form of decentralisation, 
meaning also that their authority over shaping state politics is more dependent on party 
politics than on legislative provision.
Consensus has it that decentralisation is a means to an end and not an end in itself. To 
achieve the end result therefore there is need to strengthen the decentralised 
administrative structures and the democratic representative system through the 
distribution of information and resources from the centre to the local levels and vice 
versa. The call therefore has been directed at conferring more autonomy or authority 
on councils to enable them to raise local financial resources and widen the revenue base. 
Some of the potential sources mentioned included the following:
1. Crop levy
2. Transporters’ fees charged on operators from outside the district
3. Mineral Operations Royalties
4. Decontrol of land lease and license charges and prices for services
5. Taxation on undeveloped land
6. Sharing of sales, income and excise tax revenue
7. Taxes on scotch carts, cattle, bicycles etc.
These proposed sources will however benefit others, in this case councils like Gokwe 
(because of its dynamic economy and natural resources endowment) and Harare 
(because it has a developed economic infrastructure and speculation on land).
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Comforting though is the fact that those who benefit do not do so at the expense of 
Kadoma and Harava or others that fall in their category.
The above scenario indicates that more devolution of powers to local levels does not 
necessarily mean that resources will accrue to all local authorities in the same manner 
nor does it point to the enhanced capacity to mobilise resources in those councils which 
have the potential. But this would definitely assist in identifying the strong contenders 
and the weak ones, and in turn would make the intervention of the state more purposeful 
and more focused. However, concern was raised on the extent to which (in the case of 
the strong contenders) the potential resources outlined above could be exploited 
without triggering negative social, economic and political consequences. Councillors 
were more sceptical, particularly on the practicability of exploiting the above sources, 
and the possible emergency of "local sharks" who would want to benefit more at the 
expense of the majority.
The proactive approach by local level technocrats again meets with a hurdle in the 
scepticism displayed by local level politicians. The conflicting relationship between the 
politicians and technocrats in district councils, however, serves to strengthen the 
political base of the national level ruling elite in rural areas. The position is nevertheless 
different in urban council areas. Here the position of politicians is undermined when 
councils fail to deliver. This is mainly so because politicians in rural areas are not 
currently judged by their ability to deliver through council structures as in urban areas, 
but by their intervention to avert crises through party and higher echelons of state power. 
In this regard the reluctance by the centre to devolve fiscal power is not without a strong 
base.
The ideal arrangement would accordingly be that the state budget and with it relevant 
information (through line ministries) be decentralised to local government level as this 
strengthens the position of both technocrats and politicians without much negative 
consequences. Coordination of the implementation process should be made the 
responsibility of district councils themselves with technical assistance from the line 
ministries.
State assistance will, according to this arrangement, remain a central component of the 
decentralisation policy in both district and urban councils. Statistics for Gokwe and 
Harava districts point to the above and so do those for urban councils. Total locally 
generated revenue for Gokwe only cover 91% of their recurrent expenditure and about 
50% of Harava’s internally generated income comes from beer levy. In urban areas, state 
grants account for not less than 24% of the total councils’ budgets for health and 
education.
Reduction of the level of grants and therefore of the proportion of state assistance in 
urban councils budgets have negatively affected the provision of services, through 
freezing of nursing posts and shortage of drugs, hot-sitting in schools, sharing of 
textbooks etc. Price increases in health and education as a cost recovery mechanism will 
(and have before) only contributed to reduced attendance by the intended beneficiaries. 
District councils on their part will have to forego any capital developments oh their plans 
once the state withdraws its support, with negative multiplier effects on all the council 
structures and donor projects, whose long-term sustainability is linked to the 
performance of local governments.
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6.2 Services Provision
The appraisal of the performance indicators (services provision) in the four local 
authority case study areas demonstrates that there are well performing local 
governments and others that are exhibiting some improvements in performance. There 
are also those that are performing dismally and/or are deteriorating continuously.
The two district councils analysed performed well above average in the provision of 
infrastructure (roads, boreholes, servicing of stands at growth points) accommodation, 
schools and health facilities. Two intertwined factors contributed to the above. First and 
most important is the intervention of Non-Governmental Organisations (financially and 
expertise) and District Development Fund (DDF) which is a quasi-governmental agency 
for rural development. Second, is the ability of the local council (technocrats and 
politicians) to mobilise and coordinate rural communities to participate in projects 
carried out in their wards.
Line ministries’ intervention was peripheral due mainly to budgetary constraints while 
council resources were diverted almost exclusively to income generating projects. Very 
little was mobilised from development levy (which is intended for ward development 
purposes). The main handicap at the district level is the lack of financial resources, 
technical expertise, equipment and the high rate of turnover in the officers and 
professional categories. The non-accountability of line ministries and parastatals to local 
authorities creates a confusing environment which has led to duplication of 
responsibilities and unco-ordinated use of resources. All these factors have contributed 
negatively to the actual performance of district councils.
Besides the interlocking relationship between performance and the determinant 
variables discussed earlier on, the changes or progress in the provision of services can 
also be explained by the contextual variables i.e. historical and natural conditions and 
the political and economic conditions. Harava had most of its infrastructure (roads, 
schools, health facilities) developed before 1980. This gave Harava an advantage over 
Gokwe which only saw meaningful development after independence.
Urban councils(Harare and Kadoma) studied are a typical example of the existence of 
a good performer (Harare) and of one which is deteriorating continuously (Kadoma). 
The major source of the contrast can be located on the impact which determinant 
variables have on performance (the capacity of local authorities to deliver) and also the 
influence of contextual variables (in particular differences in political support for 
different local governments). Service provision in Kadoma Urban Council is 
continuously lagging behind demand and the capacity to provide service is deteriorating 
unabated as financial resources nose dive and political support is taking a back seat. 
Equipment, finances, staff (in critical departments), and income generating projects are 
well in a state which cannot by normal standards be expected to sustain and maintain 
the existing facilities, let alone develop new ones. Population pressure, although growing 
at an average of 5% per annum (national average 3.9) cannot entirely be to blame for 
the lackluster performance by council.
Harare has managed to sustain and maintain the existing infrastructure thanks to the 
prudent budget management, stable rate of staff turnover, availability of needed 
equipment and probably strong political support from the central government.
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However, the development of new facilities has not matched the exponential increase 
in demand, caused mainly by the influx of people not only from rural areas but from 
other urban areas.
This last factor (influx of people) could provide the clue to understanding why 
decentralisation is defined differently by different local authorities interviewed. 
Although all were agreed that decentralisation was still on paper, they differed on what 
they would want done to be satisfied that decentralisation was off the ground. While 
Harare seemed to be dump-founded when the question was posed (for obvious reasons) 
Kadoma argued that investment should be redirected from Harare to small towns like 
Kadoma. District councils were agreed that a decentralised budget to councils would 
strengthen their capacity to deal with developmental projects from their constituency 
and therefore legitimatise and develop the social base of their institutions. After some 
pose Harare thought that decentralisation would be practical if the Town Management 
Boards are revisited, as their main enemy was their own bureaucracy.
6.3 Difference in Performance Across Councils
The uniform legislative framework which regulates in a very detailed way the structures, 
organisation and relations among the substructures of the respective local authorities 
assumes that all local authorities constituencies are subject to the same historical and 
natural conditions and enjoy the same amount of political and economic support from 
the centre. This assumption leads to widening of differences and declining central 
government capacity to counteract it. The comparative example of Kadoma and Harare 
is testimony to the above situation. Although these discrepancies were not evident in 
district councils studied because of a combination of interrelated factors, the same 
cannot be said if the case study area is widened. However, even in the case of the two 
districts in question, their budgetary structures reveal that there exist immense 
differences in their economic base, historical and natural conditions etc.
To avoid a situation where disadvantaged local authorities fail to perform their duties 
(including mobilising resources) the centre needs to develop the capacity to identify 
those areas in which respective local authorities are disadvantaged either naturally or 
by man-made errors and compliment them. In other words uniform decentralisation (as 
stipulated in the respective Acts) is not the solution to local government problems; it is 
only but a point of departure.
The autonomy that local authorities enjoy through decentralised administrative and 
democratic structures, responsibilities and authority can not be a substitute to 
institutional capacity building at, and financial empowerment of, the lower levels of 
government. Developing capacity to carry out programme and projects effectively at the 
local level is the necessary condition for the development of reciprocal relationships 
with other organisations and for precipitating active and sustained involvement by the 
local communities.
Identifying the potential and level of existing capacity in all the local levels of 
government by the centre becomes the starting point. This approach would facilitate the 
reaction by the centre to widening of performance differences across local authorities, 
which might crystallise into political overtones which can even threaten the political 
legitimacy not only of councils but also of the state.
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6.4 Co-production
It would be logical that the limited capacity of local authorities to adequately provide 
service to their inhabitants coupled with the non-affordability of the provided services 
by the majority of the people within the council’s jurisdiction would prompt the 
emergence of self-help community based groups. Indeed social groups at the local level 
are taking collective action to make up for what the councils are no longer able to 
provide. Housing stands shoulders above the rest as the service which has proved 
difficult to provide in urban council areas. Correspondingly housing cooperatives have 
emerged in Harare from the second half of the 1980s increasing from 10 in 1989 to 35 
at present. Together they have a total membership of nearly 7 000 people, almost 9 
percent of the total number of people on the waiting list. About 73 percent of the total 
membership earn less than $500.00 and cannot afford council houses even if they are 
availed to them. Although the cooperatives have managed to curve their way through 
to councillors, executives and top party politicians and government officials, they faced 
unsurmountable resistance from both councils, which considered them illegal and from 
politicians, who suspected them of creating new political constituencies.
District councils do not have such experiences yet. Notwithstanding, Gokwe District has 
its own new phenomenon in the Gokwe Business Association which was established at 
the Gokwe Centre in 1992. The association is a grouping of indigenous business people 
(see discussion above) who pioneered the centre during the difficult times. The major 
reason for its formation was to defend their interests which are being threatened by the 
influx of well established retailer shops and wholesalers. The only way to protect their 
interests is by influencing council business as they are resident in the area, hence their 
pressure for representation in council. Harava business people are well represented in 
council so much that any threat to their existence can easily be defeated. The council 
chairman is himself a prominent businessman at the Centre. The process of penetration 
from below is evident in both district councils.
Surprising enough, of the two urban councils surveyed only Harare has experienced the 
formation of this movement. Kadoma, regardless of the severe shortage of housing, has 
not yet registered any housing cooperatives. But like Harare, it has its share of illegal 
backyard shacks. This however, indicates that for the "third sector" to emerge other 
contributory factors beyond "demand gap argument" should be at play.
7.0 CONCLUSION
The impact of decentralisation policy on the performance of local governments has been 
assessed by carrying out an evaluation of selected performance indicators, namely, 
resource mobilisation and service provision. Factors which would possibly affect these 
services were also examined. They were categorised into direct and indirect variable.
The decentralisation strategy adopted by the Zimbabwean governent is characterised 
be ceding of power through small scale incremental transfers of authority and 
responsibilities to iocal authorities. This process is reciprocated by an apparent 
withdrawal by the centre from local level affairs. Practically this approach only applies
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to the rural areas of Zimbabwe (district councils) as the urban areas already enjoyed 
much more powers and autonomy even before 1980. The one city concept (which is an 
exercise initiated at independence aimed at involving the indigenous Zimbabweans in 
council affairs) is the only new dimension added to urban local authorities.
The approach outlined above has two sides to it. The first is that it is gradual and 
judicious. This indeed is its strong point as the ceding of power and responsibilities is 
considered carefully and only after accessing the resources on hand and the possible 
impact of the move on many other economic, social and political levels. The second side 
is that it generates the tendency by those who cede authority and responsibilities to 
centralise both authority and resources on the pretext that absorptive capacity does not 
exist at the local levels and that the disposable resources at the centre are so limited that 
by spreading them thinly the desired results can not be realised. However, 
responsibilities are easily delegated.
Mismatch between resources and responsibilities is created. To fill in this gap in district 
councils two factors need to be mentioned. These are the intervention of the NGOs and 
District Development Fund which is a quasi-governmental organisation. Local 
authorities resourcefully responded to the above mismatch by quantitatively increasing 
revenues.generated within their districts, and mobilisation of their communities around 
projects implemented in their areas. What did not develop nonetheless is the capacity 
of the District Councils to provide these services themselves. Urban councils had the 
capacities to provide services developed will before independence. Mismatches 
between resources and responsibilities were mainly as a result of policy directives from 
the centre which included control regime (this in part also affects district councils); 
services provided by councils on behalf of the state etc (state not compensating for the 
services of doing so late). The cost recovery approach (which is the backbone of urban 
councils) has been constantly tempered with in the process, disrupting the provision of 
services and the very capacity of councils to provide for their communities.
Three broad policy areas need to be highligthed in order to go beyond the current policy 
debate on decentralisation. First, state budget and with it relevant information (through 
line ministries) should be decentralised to local government level as this strengthens the 
position of both technocrats and politicians without much negative consequences. 
Co-ordination of the formulation, planning and implemnetation process should be the 
responsibility of district councils themselves with technical assistance from line 
ministries experts.
Second, to avoid a situation where disadvantaged local authorities fail to provide services 
due to policy directives or to natural, economic and historical factors, the centre has to 
develop the capacity of mechanism to speedily identify the affected councils with a view 
of complementing their effort.
Third and by its long term nature most important is that administrative and democratic 
structures, responsibilities and authority cannot be a substitute to institutional capacity 
building and financial empowerment. What is important is to develop the capacity at 
the local level to carry out programme and projects, and create the necessary conditions 
(economic opportunities) for the active participation of the different civic organisations 
and communities.
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CONTEXTUALISATION OF THE CASE STUDY AREAS 
KADOMA TOWN COUNCIL
Kadoma is situated 141 kilometres from the country’s capital Harare on the main road 
and rail links to Bulawayo and the South.lt occupies a gently sloping site which is 
dissected by a ridge draining in easterly westerly directions.The geological formations 
are pre-dominantly volcanic with high mineral content. Kadoma is located in Natural 
Geographic Region lib hence characterised by a seasonal rainfall average of 770 cubic 
centimetres and mild temperatures ranging from 22 degrees Celsius in winter and 33 
degrees Celsius in summer.
These climatic conditions and soil characteristics combine to make the Kadoma area 
conducive to agricultural production.At present, the concentration is on cash crops such 
as cotton, tobacco, seed crop and maize.
With an annual growth rate of 9,3% the population of Kadoma currently stands at 98,600 
of which 47 100 are females.These are housed in six suburbs of which three are high 
density.Housing occupancy averages 10 people per house.
The manufacturing sector is the largest employer of labour followed by the distributing 
sector. Recent industrial development has brought a situation of diversification i.e. 
Glass factory, Tissue Mill, Fine Paper Mill, Plastic Factory, Tanning Industry and Oil 
Extraction Factory .The largest employer, however, is the mining sector (Eiffel Flats) 
employing about 7 000 workers of the total work-force within the municipal area of 
approximately 16 000.
The production of gold in this region has accounted for a third of the total national 
output.The area is also rich in base minerals, principally copper, nickel and platinum as 
well as chrome magnetite and limestone.Also situated in Kadoma is the Nickel Refinery 
which treats nickel from mines outside Zimbabwe.
The Grain Marketing Board, Cold Storage Commission and the Dairy Marketing Board 
all have depots in Kadoma.The Cotton Research Institute and a ginnery are also situated 
in Kadoma, a major cotton growing area.
Besides communal activities with large chain-stores and supermarkets and major 
commercial banks and financial institutions Kadoma also boasts of an informal sector 
based largely on the use of cotton products to make artifacts and handcrafts ranging from 
blankets to quilts and table mats.
GOKWE DISTRICT COUNCIL
Situated 281 kilometers from the capital Harare, Gokwe District has an estimated 
population of 360 400 with average population growth of 4,7% per annum. Gokwe 
District is the most northerly in the Midlands Province and shares common boundaries 
with the administrative districts of Kadoma and Karoi to the north-east, Kadoma and 
Kwekwe to the east, Nkayi to the south and Lupane and Binga to the south-west.Its total
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area is 18 140km or 1 814 000 ha, (1/11 of total of Zimbabwe).
Served by major rivers such as Sanyati and Sengwa, the district is rich in many mineral 
deposits such as coal, gold and nickel.The district has an abundant wildlife with 
considerable numbers of elephant, buffalo, antelope, kudu and large predators such as 
lions and leopards.
' Lying in agro-ecological regions 3,4 & 5 the minimum annual rainfall of Gokwe is 
650mm slightly below the national average of 674mm. The soils are predominantly deep 
Kalahari sands hence the districts boom in cotton, maize, sorghum, millet and sunflower.
The district, however has a generally underdeveloped infrastructure especially the road 
network system.Road construction by the District Development Fund (DDF) currently 
being undertaken will improve the lot of farmers who are at present handicapped by the 
cost of obtaining goods and agricultural inputs and the difficulty of getting their produce 
to markets,Commercial activity is centred at 1 Growth Point, 17 Rural Service Centres 
and 252 Business Centres. Crop Marketing facilities exist at 3 Grain Marketing Board 
Depots, 3 Cotton Marketing Depots and several approved Grain Buyers.
Communications have been greatly improved by the introduction of a Post Office at the 
Growth Point and postal agencies in outlying areas.The boOm in agri-business has also 
lured the country’s major commercial banks to Gokwe. The Growth Point itself is a hive 
, of activity to large nationwide chain-Stores.A hotel, garages, small scale sector of 
informal industry compliment the busy Growth Point.
HARAVA DISTRICT. COUNCIL
Situated about 36 kilometres along the Harare-Marondera road. Harava district covers 
a total of 5 601 hectares mostly occupied by peasant farmers with little production 
output. Haraya’s estimated population stands at 28 500 who are mainly curtailed in their 
agricultural production potential by the sandy and infertile sOils.However rainfall 
averages are satisfactory with a seasonal average of 950 cubic centimetres and annual 
mean temperatures are around 18 degrees Celsius but frost is common in 
winter.Communal farmers mainly depend on maize and groundnuts for consumption 
but market excess produce to the Grain Marketing Board.Poor agricultural performance 
is attributed to the poor soils whose low fertility needs to be complimented by inputs of 
agricultural chemicals and fertilizers.However, regardless of these limiting factors 
agricultural production in Harava has improved tremendously since 1981.1n 1981 
farmers produced 51,620 bags of maize and 350 bags of edible beans but in 1992 they 
produced 118 800 bags of maize and 700 bags of edible beans respectively.
Harava’s proximity to the country’s capital city, Harare, where infrastructural 
development is up to required standards has robbed it of potential industrial 
development. Electricity is adequate, water is easily available as it is located within 
Harare’s catchment area, labour is in excess and industrial stands are far much 
affordable than in Harare but poor infrastructural development and a lackluster 
campaign for developmental projects by the district council officials are mainly to blame 
for Harava’s dismal development performance.
However, Dema Growth Point boasts of a number of commercial enterprises ranging 
from general dealers shops, bottle stores, a garage and a hotel.
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HARARE CITY COUNCIL
Harare is the political and administrative capital of Zimbabwe.Its area is currently 
estimated at 559 km/sq but keeps enlarging because of the construction of outlaying 
suburbs to accommodate the ever increasing population currently estimated at 1 121 
468.
All various sector ministries have their headquarters in this metropolitan centre. The 
country’s chief lawrmakers/legislators are housed in Harare as is the highest institution 
of learning and research, The University of Zimbabwe.
All major companies and parastatals except the National Railways of Zimbabwe have 
their head offices in Harare. Multi-national co-operations have established themselves 
in Harare - the second largest city in Southern Africa after Johannesburg.Sixty-three 
Diplomatic Missions are housed in this city.Major local International hotels are part and 
parcel of Harare as is the Harare International Airport, the only one in the country.
The Harare City Council is the administrative authority of the city which is demarcated 
into forty-two (42) Wards for purposes of representation in Council Chambers. Harare 
boasts of a diversified and sophisticated infrastructure characterised by a well developed 
manufacturing industry undoubtedly the largest employers in the city.More than 70% 
of Zimbabwe’s manufacturing industry takes place in the country’s two largest cities of 
Harare and Bulawayo. The country’s financial sector which consists of a wide range of 
banking institutions, insurance companies and the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange which 
forms the hub of the financial sector have fully established themselves in Harare.
The city, obviously a hive of capacity, has monopolised industry and commerce at the 
detriment of other up-coming towns like Bulawayo, Gweru, Mutare etc hence it has 
been nick-named "Bambazonke" - a Ndebele dictum for a selfish grabber "all - taker". 
However as is common with all major metropolitans Harare has its own share of social 
ills like the critical accommodation and transport crises. Destitutes paint a gloomy social 
picture of the political, administrative and financial capital of Zimbabwe.
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T a b l e  1 1 ( a )
H a r a v a  D i s t r i c t  C o u n c i l  
I n c o m e  G e n e r a t i n g  P r o j e c t s
Y e a r S o u r c e A m o u n t
1988-1989 Sand Sales 
Brick Sales 
Market.Fees 
Beerhall rentals 
Kiosk rentals 
Transport hire 
 ^Gunlope sa1es
$11 800
13 056
14 900 
3 600 
2 400 
7 200 
1,150
. Totals 54,106
Total Local Revenue - $449 414
T a b l e  1 1 ( b )
Y e a r S o u r c e A m o u n t
1989-1990 Beer Sales 
Beerhall rents 
Brick Sales 
Market fees 
Kiosk rentals 
Transport hire 
Grinding mill fees 
Garden produce fees
$721 660 
8 200 
7 300 
17 734 
2 063 
7 806 
77 
1 596
Totals $778 436
Total Local Revenue $1 744 423
49
Table 11(c)
Year Source Account
1990-1991 Beer Sales $710 Q00
Beerhall rentals 9 000
Sand sales 63 000
Brick sales 54 000
Cement sales 18 000
Market fees 45 000
Kiosk rental 4 800
Transport hire 10 000
Grinding mill fees 4 000
Garden produce fees 2 000
Total $919 800
Total Local Revenue $1 520 000
Table 11(d)
Year Source Amount
1991-1992 Brick sales $26 900
Grinding mill fees 3 940
Beer sales $746 900
Totals 680 740
Total Local Revenue $1 700 000
50
Table 11(e)
Y e a r S o u r c e A m o u n t
1992-1993 Beer sales $1 153 456
Brick sales & cement 303 200
Grinding mill fees 5 400
Garden produce sales 2 400
Totals $1 464 456
Total Local Revenue $2 955 414
T a b l e  1 1 ( f )
T o t a l  I n c o m e  f r o m P r o j e c t s  R e l a t i v e  t o  T o t a l L o c a l I n c o m e
P r o j e c t  I n c o m e  T o t a l  I n c o m e  P e r c e n t a g e  *
*1988-1989 54 106 1 569 724 4
1989-1990 778 436 1 744 423 47
1990-1991 ; 919 800 1 520 922 60
1991-1992 780 740 1 385 928 56
1992-1993 1 464 456 2 955 414 50
* B e e r  S a l e s  n o t  i n c l u d e d  
S o u r c e :  T a b l e  1 1  H a r a v a  A n n u a l  B u d g e t .
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Table 13
Services Provided and Service Planned for
But Not Provided: Harare
1 .  W o r k s W o r k s
(a) Road Maintainance
(b) Buildings (Stand
(a) Surgery Construction
Services
(c) Water reticulation
Education
(d) Sewege reticulation (a) Secondary Education
(e) Farming
(f) Anemities
(b) Tertiary Education
(g) Surreys
•(h) Refuse Collection
Housing
(a) Middle income
2. Education Residences
(b) Siya-so Industrial
(a) Pre-Schools
(b) Primary Schools
Stands
(c) Secondary Community Services
3 . Housing (a) Market Stalls
(a) Bachelor Accomodation
(b) Flats
Health
(c) Family Houses (a) Specialised
(d) Leasing Treatment of Genito 
Urinal Diseases
4 . Community Services 
(a) Clubs and Societies
(STD's, AIDS & HIV)
(b) Swimming Pools
(c) Libraries
(d) Co-operatives
(e) Recreational Facilities
5. Health Services
(a) Environmental Health
(b) Health Inspection 
Services
(c) Health. Education
(d) General Health
(e) Infectious Diseases 
Control
S o u r c e :  c i t y  o f  H a r a r e  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  W o r k s  R e p o r t s .
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Table 14
Services Provided And Service Planned
For But Not Provided
1. Works Works
(a) Water & Sewege Reticulation (a) Poultry Projects
(b) Road and Bridge (b) Piped Water
Construction Schemes in Rural
(c) Service roads & street 
Lighting
Areas
2 . Education Education
(a) Pre-Schools (a) 'A' Level School
(b) Primary Education (b) Tertiary/
(c) Secondary Education Technical College
3 . Housincr Housina
Housing Accomodation 
Teachers/Nurses
(a) Stand Servicing
Accomodation Community Services
4. Community Services (a) Soccer Studio
(b) Community Halls
(a) Liquor Outlets (c) Recreation
(b) Shops
(c) Woodlets .
Centres
(d) Photo Studio
(e) Grinding Mills
Health
(a) Ambulance
5. Health Services Services
(a) Clinical Services
(b) Health Centres
(c) Mobile Clinics
(d) Health Education
(e) General Family Health
(f) Sanitary Facilities
S o u r c e :  G ok w e D i s t r i c t  C o u n c i l  P r o j e c t  P l a n n i n g  D e p a r t m e n t
R e p o r t s .
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Table 15
Services Provided and Services Planned For
But Not Provided: Kadoma
1. Works Works
(a) :Water & Sewage reticulation (a) Tarred Roads
. (b) Road Construction and (esp. in high
Maintanance. density Suburb
(c) . Housing Construction and (RIMUKA)
2 . Education. Education
(a) Pre-School 1. Secondary Education
(b) Primary School (1) 2. Tertiary Education
3 . Housincr Health
High’
i  ‘ » •; -& ’Low Density Leasing (a) Mobile Clinic
4 . Community Services Community Services
(a) V Beerhalls (a) Social & Sports
,(b ). . Libraries facilities in:■ ( C ) - • :Clubs Low Density
(d) •Halls. (Theatre) Suburbs
(e) •iFieidb/-Courts Pool,
Theatres
5. Health Services
(a) Refuse Removal
•(b).' ? Environmental Health
(c) Primary Health
(d) Health Education,
. ( e ) :  : : General Family Health
S o u r c e :  K adom a T ow n C o u n c i l  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  W o r k s  R e p o r t s .
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Table 16
Services Provided and Services Planned For
But Not Provided: Harava
1. Works Works
(a) Water & Sewage reticulation
(b) Road Construction and
(a) Solar Electrification
Maintainance Education
2. Education 1. Pre-school Facilities
2. School-leavers
(a) Primary
(b) Secondary
Technical College
3 . Housincr Housincr
Construction (a) Teachers Association
Leasing (b) Stand Servicing
(c) Provision of Title
Deeds
4 . Community Services Community Services
(a) Beerhall & Bar Facilities (a) Library Construction
(b) Recreational
Facilities Hall
5. Health Services
(a) General Family Health
(b) Environmental Health
Health
(c) Health Education (a) Operating Surgery
Source: Harava District Council Project Planning Department Report.
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T a b l e  17  
H a r a r e
T y p e  o f  S e r v i c e C o r r e s p o n d i n g  S o u r c e  o f  S u p p o r t i n g  R e s o u r c e s
Education . Ministry of Education and Culture 
Community Groups
Housing Ministry of Public Construction and 
National Housing 
World Bank
Non-Governmental Organisation 
Housing Co-operatives 
Ministry of National Affairs, 
Employment Creation and 
Co-operatives
Community Services Private Clubs and Societies 
Private Individuals
Health Services Private Hospitals and Clinics 
Ministry of Health . 
Non-Governmental Organisations 
Private Doctors
Works Ministry of Energey, Water Resources 
& Development ZESA.
S o u r c e :  H a r a r e  C i t y  C o u n c i l  F i l e s .
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Type of Service Correspondence Source of Supporting Resources
Table 18
Kadoma
Education Ministry of Education and Culture. 
Community Groups 
Jairos Jiri Association
Housing Ministy of Public Construction 
and National Housing 
Art Corporation 
Rio Tinto (Pvt) Ltd
Community Services Private Clubs and Societies
- .........
Private Businessman &
Individuals
Rio Tinto (Pvt) Ltd
Health Ministry of Health 
Private Companies 
,Private Doctors
Works Ministry of Energy, Water 
Resources & Development 
Community Groups
Source; Kadoina Town Council Piles.
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T y p e  o f  S e r v i c e s
T a b l e  1 9  
G okw e
C o r r e s p o n d i n g  S o u r c e  o f  S u p p o r t i n g  R e s o u r c e s
Education Ministry of Education and Culture 
Seventh Day Adventist 
Community Groups 
Catholic Church
Swedish International Development 
Agency
European Economic Community
Housing Ministry of Public Construction and 
National Housing
Pilot District Support Programme (UK)
Community Services Private Individuals & Organisations
Health Ministry of Health
Pilot District Support Programme (UK) 
Mission Hospitals (Catholic Church)
Works Ministry of Energy, Water Resources 
& Development ZESA
S o u r c e :  G o k w e D i s t r i c t C o u n c i l  P i l e s .
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* T y p e  o f  S e r v i c e
T a b l e  2 0  
H a r a r e
C o r r e s p o n d i n g  S o u r c e  o f  S u p p o r t i n g  R e s o u r c e s
Education Ministry of Education and Culture 
Community Groups
Housing, Ministry of Public Construction and 
National Housing 
. World Bank
Non-Governmental Organisation 
Housing Co-operatives 
Ministry of National Affairs, 
Employment Creation and 
Co-operatives
Community Services Private Clubs and Societies 
Private Individuals
Health Services Private Hospitals and Clinis 
Ministry of Health 
Non-Governmental Organisations 
Private Doctors
Works Ministry of Energy, Water Resources 
& Development ZESA
* O t h e r  t h a n  t h o s e  p r o v i d e d  b y  C o u n c i l  
S o u r c e :  H a r a r e  C i t y  C o u n c i l  F i l e s
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Table 21
Equipment: Kadoma
M o v e a b l e  P r o p e r y  O w n ed Q u a n t i t y
Water Bowser 1
Tractors 6
7 Tonne Trucks 3
3 Tonne Trucks 2
Pick Ups 6
Tipper 1
Mayoral Car 1
Small Vehicles 3
Ambulances 2
Fire Tenders 2
Rapid Intervention Vehicles 2
S o u r c e :  K adom a T ow n  C o u n c i l ' s  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  D e p a r t m e n t
T a b l e  2 2
E q u i p m e n t : G o k w e
M o v e a b l e  P r o p e r t y  O w n ed Q u a n t i t y
Leyland Commet 1
Landrover 5
Mazda B1800 1
Tractor 1
Datsun Patrol 1
Universal Grader 1
Trailers 3
Isuzu DX19 1
Ploughs 2
Water Engine 9
Oxmco Welding Machine 1
Welding Helmet 1
Combination Spanner 13
Ring Spanner 2
Socket Spanner 5
S o u r c e :  G o k w e D i s t r i c t  C o u n c i l  F i l e s
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Table 23
Equipment: Harava
Moveable Propery Owned Quantity
Tractor 
Truck(s)
Ambulance
Grader
Grinding Mill
Brick Moulding Machine
1
3
1
1
1
1
Source: Harava District Council Files
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PROJECTS DONE
COST AND IMPLEMENTING AGENCY
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4.3.2. PROJECTS FOR LOCAL FUNDING
PR IO R IT Y PROJECT NAME WARD E S T . COST SOURCE
D E SC R IPT IO N OF
FUNDING
1.1 Borehole Cleanouts
1.1.1 Charama Hills Sai 15 000 Donor
1.1.2 Mutangadura Sai II II II
1.1.3 Jiri School Jiri II II
1.1.4 Gwetsanga Sch Jiri II II
1.1.5 Magondo Village Chisina III II 1
1.2 New Boreholes
1.2.1 Ngani Sch B/H Nemangwe III 20 000 Donor
1.2.2 Chikunakuna B/H Chisina III 1 II
1.2.3 Chidoma B/H Madzivazvido 1
1.2.4 Chitsa B/C Gumunyu I II
1.2.5 Manyangavana II II 1
1.2.6 Maleke Video Nenyunga II II
1.2.7 Mangena Sch Sai I II II
1.2.8 Makamure Sch Makore III 1 II
1.2.9 Nevana Chireya III II II
1.2.10 Jordan Tank 2 Masuka II II
1.2.11 Chita Chezvipo St Agnes Mis C.Z.M/Donor
1.5 Wells
1 . 5 . 1 M a c h a k a t a N i e l e l e  I 6 0 0 0 L A /D o n o r
1 . 5 . 2 Z v i b h o r a n i
S i m b a r i n o p a
H u c h u II II
1 . 5 . 3 Z im b o d z a  S c h o o l M a su k a IB IV
1 . 5 . 4 R u crora  S c h o o l N em a n a w e IV II
1 . 5 . 5 S i b o i i w e  S im b e C h i r e v a  I I I BB BB
2.0 Rural Road Network
2.1 Mutehwe/Katamba 
Rd 121
Nembudziya II 500 ,000 Donor
3.0 Health Services
3.1 Zimbabwe Spiritual 
Healing & Centre Gumunyu I 65 000 Donor
3.1 Nyadohwe Clinic Gumunyu I 220 000 L. A
3.2 Huchu Clinic Huchu 75 000 Self Help 
Donor
64
4.2 Primarv Schools
.
4.2.1 Savarada School Chireya II 45 00 0
4.2.2 Mutsamvi Mkoka/Msala II
4.2.3 Rugare - Gumunyu II 11
4.2.4 Kufakairi Sch Chireya I II
4.2.5 Vocational Training 
Feasibility Studies Nembudziya I 45 000
Gokwe . G .P II
Muyambi I I
4.5 Pre-Schools All Wards 100 000
4.6 Adult Literacy All Wards with 
emphasis in 
Nenyungu and 
Simchembu
5.0 Acrricultural Development
5.3 Grazina Schemes
5.3.1 Chevecheve Chisina I 100 000
5.3.2 Huchu Huchu 100 000
5.3.3 Game Corridor Madzivasvido 5 000 000
Chireya I & 
Nenyunga
6.0
7
8
Land Use Planning 
and Geological 
Surveys
Accelerated. Land Use 
Demarcation
All Vfards
Basic Infrastracture 
at Gokwe Growth Point
9
9.3.1
Natural Conservation 
Stragegy
Eight Woodlots . Ngomeni I 8 000
10. Employment Opport
10.1 Kamhororo Consolidated
L. AI
II
II
Donor
ii
ii
Self Help 
5%
Self-Help
Donor
ii
L. A
L . A & 
Donor
Donor & 
Self Help 
Italian 
A i d  
P.S.I.P
Forestry
Commision
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10.2
10.3
10.4
11.
Gardens Nemangwe IV
Uniform Making Nemangwe I 15 000
Shingai Poultry 
& Market Gardening
Project Njelelo I n  ooo
Vocational Training Nembudzia I 50 000 
Centre
Data Gathering Data 
Collection All Wards
Donor
ii
ii
ii
Donor L.A
TOTAL 48 6 9 2 9  0 0 0
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GOKWE
4.3.0 Year I: Projects for 1991/92
4 . 3 . 1  PROJECTS PER PSIP FUNDING IMPLEMENTING AGENT
1.1 B o r e h o l e  c l e a n o u t s WARD COST DDP/MEWRD
1.1.1 Mucharonga Jiri $15 000 II
1.1.2 Mudondo Goredema ; II
1.1.3 Tazivana 1 n II
1.1.4 Svova Nembudzia I II
1.1.5 Mkulunga Jahana It
1.1.6 Matengwa Sai II ii II
1.2 New Boreholes
1.2.1 Gwarusonde Nemangwe I $20 000 DDF/MEWRD
1.2.2 Zvikwete Nemangwe Illq II
1.2.3 Mutirimukwa Chireya III II
1.2.4 Kaj imivanda Chireya I II 1
1.2.5 Charama Nemangwe I II
1.2.6 Chota Nembudzia III II II
1.2.7 Zanda School Chireya III II
1.2.8 Zimwara Sai I II
1.2.9 Matsikinya Ndhlalambi I
1.2.10 Kamwa Nembudzia II 1 II
1.3 Piped Water Schemes
1 . 3 . 1 K a m h o r o r o  P / s c h e m e N eancrw e IV $100 0 0 0 it
1 . 3 . 2 M a s u k a  R e h a b M a s u k a $ 2 5 0  0 0 0 II
o
0
CM Roads and Bridges
2.1 Choto-Mbungu T/off
Road 107 Jiri $789 600 DDF
2.2 Gokwe-Nyarupakwe
Road 108 Njelele/Chisina$489 600 1
2.3 Lukukwe-Sai Rd 104 50 400 It
3.0 Health Services
3.1 Dambamazuna RHC Chireya IIIII 275 000 MOH
4.1 Education
Lower sixth form Gokwe G .P . 500 000 MPCNH
4.4.1 Madzivazvido Sec Madzivazvido 150 000 He & LA
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35 000 V e t 
Services
5. Aaricultural Development
5.1 A.H.H.C
5.1.1 Manyeni Sai I
5.1.2 Blue-Gum Chisina I
5.1.3 Masakadza Nemangwe II
5.1.4 Denda Chireya II
5.1.5 Kana Mission Chirima
5.1.6 . Sengwa Bridge Sai II
5.6 Chemahororo Irr Scheme Njelele II 72 000
6. Land Use Planning and Geological Surveys
6.1 Kajuirivanda Rural Housing Chireya I
6.2 Land Use Implementation Ngomeni 300 i000
.7. Rural Electrification
7.1 . Manoti R.S.C Muyambi
7.2 Njelele R.S.C Njelele I
7.3 Gokwe G . P Gokwe Central
8. Basic Infrasturcture Gokwe G.P
8.1 Low Cost Houses Gokwe G .P $575 000
8.2 Sports Stadium II $250 000
8.3 Community Hall H $275 000
9. Natural Conservation Strateav
9.1 Mapfumo sponge Prot Njelele III $ 8 807
9.2 Mangilazi Gully ext Chisina II 1 214
9.3 Chemhangwa Sponge Ndlalambi I 2 500
9.4 Majaji Cons Garden Nemangwe I 4 056
9.5 Mvumba. Gully S imchembu 2 206
9.6 Magoboyi sponge Ndlalambi I 2 400
and G Garden
S o u r c e  G o k w e D i s t r i c t  C o u n c i l  R o l l i n g  P l a n
Agritex
Ag r i t ex 
LA
ZESA
ii
ii
L. A 
L. A 
L. A
Nat ResI
II
I
IV
§
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P r o j e c t s  E m b a r k e d  U p o n  B y  H a r a v a  D i s t r i c t  C o u n c i l  i n  1 9 9 2 / 9 3  F i s c a l  
Y e a r
Project Cost Source of Funding Implementing
Agent
Zhakata. Ward i  
Grazing Scheme
Z$80.000 Harava District 
Council
Harava D.C.
Fencing. Gombe 
Gullery
Z$ 6.000 Natural Resource 
Board
Harava
N.R.B.
D.C/
Chivasa Village 
. Reclamation
Z$691.000 Natural Resources 
Board
Harava
N.R.B.
D.C/
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Proj ect Cost Sound of :Funding Implementing
Agent
Construction of 
Guzha Market
Z$180.000 . Harava 
District 
Council
Harava D.C.
Construction of 
Cattle Sale Pen 
at Dema
Z$ 20.000 Natural
Resources
Vet Department 
/Harava D.C.
Ngome Ward
Agricultural
Garden
Z$ 12.000 Health 
' Ministry
Harava D.C.
Batsiranai Wire 
Making Co-op 
Karengwa & 
Taguta
Gardening Co­
ops
Z$ 25.000 Zimbabwe 
Women1s 
Bureau & 
NGO's & 
Co-ops
Z imbabwe Women1s 
Bureau & NGO1s 
& Dept of Co-ops
Ngezi Butchery 
Poultry Pfungwa 
Hupfumi Poultry 
& Sewing
Z$ 27.000 ZWB, 
NGO's
ZWB, NG0"s
Mutiusinazita
Ngome
.Z$ 20.000 ZWB,
NGO's
NGO's, Agritex 
& Harava D.C.
Mutiusinazita,
Mutowodzwa,
Kurima
Kwakanaka &
Chenhondoro
Gardening
Co-ops.
Ngome
Z$ 58.000 ZWB,
NGO's
ZWB & NGO
W a t e r  D e v e l o p m e n t
Proj ect Cost Source of Funding Implementing
Agent
Five (5) Boreholds at Z$60. 
Mapfuti, Zhakata & 
Chirima-mhunga Wards
(
000 District Dev. District Dev. 
Fund
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Roads
Project Cost Source of Funding Implementing 
Agent '
Chinyanga-Boni, Dema 
Zinhanga, Chiota 
Ardilusa 
Chitungwiza- 
Ushewekunze (47,6km)
Z$279.000 District 
Devt. Fund
District
Fund
Devt.
Road Maintainance 
104km
Z$ 63.000 District 
Devt. 
Fund
.District 
Fund
Devt.
E x t e r n a l l y  F u n d e d  P r o j e c t s
Project
Beatrice-Sewerage and 
Water Reticulation
Cost
Z$180.000
Source of 
Migrud
Funding Implementing
Agent
Migrud &.PSIP
L o c a l l y  F u n d e d  P r o i e c t s
Project Cost Source of Funding Implementing
Agents
Electrification of 
Township, Beatrice 
Primary & Secondary 
Schools
Z$22.000 Harava
District
Council
Z . E . S . A
E d u c a t i o n  ( E x t e r n a l l y  F u n d e d )* (M on w e r e  L o c a l l y  F u n d e d )
Project Cost Source of Funding Implementing
Agent
Nyabira Pre-school Z$3 0.000 P.S.I.P.
Education
Harava District 
Council
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Projects Envisaged in 1993-94 Financial Year by Harava District Council 
Agriculture
Project
Fencing of Muzorovi
Beerhall Renovations 
& Electrification
Cost
Z$30.000 
Z$70.000
Source of Funding
District Devt. 
Fund
District Devt. 
Fund
Implementing
Agent
District Devt. 
Fund
District Devt. 
Fund
Income Generating Projects
Proj ect Cost Source of Funding Implementing
Agent
Beehive Erection Z$30.000 District Devt. District Devt.
Fund Fund
Beerhall Renovations 
& Eletrification of 
of Dema Kiosks
Z$70.000 District Devt. 
Fund
District Devt. 
Fund
Source: Harava District Council Plans
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